

②

It may take several weeks to pass the Appropriation Bill but in the meantime tentative orders can be placed - Best of luck

Roswell

TELEGRAM SENT

ATP

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (C)

March 8, 1941

11 p.m.

AMEMBASSY

LONDON

786

**CONFIDENTIAL** FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Please transmit the following message to former naval person:

QUOTE Personal. Notwithstanding some delay the ultimate passage by vote of sixty to thirty-one is highly satisfactory. Final concurrent action by the House followed by my signature should take place Tuesday evening. Confidentially I hope to send estimate for new orders and purchases under the bill to the House on Wednesday. Best of luck. Roosevelt. ENDQUOTE.

HULL  
(ASB)

S:ASB

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

March 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I held up this proposed dispatch to Churchill because I wanted first to talk with Halifax. I explained to Halifax that it is of the utmost importance to us because of the Congressional situation that the matter of the bases be settled quickly. He is telegraphing his Government to that effect.

I think we should do the same to our people. Winant is pushing it too.

In regard to points of difficulty, simple solutions can be found, as for example:

1. In regard to port dues, all United States Government ships go to our eight bases without having to pay port dues. All non-United States Government owned ships, whether they go to any of our eight bases or not, should pay the regular British Island dues.
2. In the case of navigational facilities, the United States Government should pay for and maintain all navigational facilities made necessary by our use of these eight bases. The British should pay for and maintain all others.
3. Because these eight bases are definitely military areas, British ships should be excluded from these areas except when authorized to enter them by the United States representative. This applies to local fishing boats, to whom revocable licenses might be given by the American representative, and actually would be given in normal times.

4. In regard to legal jurisdiction, the solution is clear. Where the offense is a normal police matter -- disturbance of the peace, assault, robbery or even a murder -- if the person is a native, the jurisdiction should lie in the Island court, whether the crime was committed on the reservation or off of it. Where such a crime or misdemeanor was committed by an American officer or enlisted man, off the reservation, the crime should be tried in an Island court; and where the crime was committed by an officer or enlisted man on the reservation, it should be tried by the Naval or Military authorities.

In regard to a narrow classification of crimes committed on the reservation, such as sabotage, espionage, etc., the jurisdiction would be in the American authorities for trial on the reservation or in an American court, the offense being against the Government of the United States.

5. In regard to dues to furniture for the use of Army, Navy or Marine Corps, to food, clothing, tobacco, etc., for their use on the reservation, they should enter free of Island dues. There should be a solemn undertaking on our part, however, that the resale of any article thus brought to the reservation, and later taken across the line for use anywhere off the reservation, would be severely punished and put an end to. As a matter of practical fact, in all of these Islands clothing, liquor, etc., can be bought more cheaply on the Island than it can be imported from the United States. The only real exception is that of cigarettes. The British Island dues on our cigarettes are very high. Cigarettes should, therefore, pay no duty going into our reservation for use there, but any person selling any of them outside the reservation should be severely punished.



XXX

February 25, 1941

AMEMBASSY

LONDON (ENGLAND)

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I have been very much concerned at the delay in reaching an agreement in respect to the naval and air bases. At your request I was glad to reconsider the question of the place in which the negotiations were to take place and in view of the considerations advanced by you to send a delegation to London. This delegation has now been in London over a month and a satisfactory agreement has not yet been reached. Indeed the negotiations appear to be deadlocked on a number of points of considerable importance.

In connection with request for appropriations to construct these bases, our War and Navy Departments will be questioned by Congressional Committees within the next week. They will be asked detailed questions in regard to the status of these bases and the provisions of the leases. On the basis of the present situation,

satisfactory answers cannot be given to these questions and this inability to give satisfactory answers would probably lead to still more questions. Already adverse discussion has developed in Congress and in the press, in regard to the conditions under which we are acquiring these bases. It seems to me imperative, in all these circumstances, that a satisfactory agreement in respect to the bases be completed without further delay. Such an agreement would provide effective answers to questions which may otherwise prove to be embarrassing in the working out of many of the important immediate problems we have before us. I do hope that you will be able to urge your people to expedite the decisions our negotiators are now awaiting.

Eu:JDH:NDM

PA/D:JCD:FMB



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Reports from our representatives in London negotiating the base leases have indicated that delays have been encountered in receiving decisions from the British Government on pending questions. Upon the occasion of a call at the Department by the British Ambassador on Tuesday, February 25, I took the opportunity to call this matter to his attention. He asked that he be permitted to present a memorandum on the subject which he accordingly sent on February 26, a copy of which I am enclosing. I am today sending him in reply a memorandum, a copy of which I am also enclosing with this letter.

Appropriation requests are now before Committees of the Senate and House, and hearings are already called by the House Appropriation Committee on the Army appropriation for this purpose. The War and Navy Departments have been notified by the Congressional Committees that full information will be desired with regard to the terms and conditions of the leases and any other agreements which

have

The President,

The White House.




have been made or are contemplated with regard to the establishment of these bases, and both the War and Navy Departments are apprehensive of criticism which might arise as the result of inability to give conclusive answers to these questions.

I am convinced that the British Government and this Government are not at all far apart on the questions now under discussion in London with regard to the terms of the leases and the accompanying agreements for the use and operation of the bases, and that the most important element in the whole situation at this time is to obtain a prompt settlement and agreement on the questions still pending. I have therefore drafted a suggested telegram which if it meets with your approval might be sent as a message from you to Mr. Churchill in an effort to have the matters at issue concluded as soon as possible.

The Navy and War Departments have been consulted with regard to the suggestion that you send a message to the British Prime Minister for this purpose and have both approved of such a step. I also feel that it would be advisable to make this effort to expedite the conclusion of these negotiations.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, which appears to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large loop at the beginning and end.



MEMORANDUM

It was provided in the notes exchanged between Mr. Cordell Hull and Lord Lothian on September 2nd, 1940, that,

"His Majesty's Government in the leases to be agreed upon will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of territorial waters and air spaces adjacent or in the vicinity of such bases, necessary to provide access to and defence of such bases and appropriate provisions for their control.

"Without prejudice to the above-mentioned rights of the United States authorities and their jurisdiction within the leased areas, the adjustment and reconciliation between the jurisdiction of the authorities of the United States within these areas and the jurisdiction of the authorities of the territories in which those areas are situated shall be determined by common agreement."

In accordance with the foregoing provisions, discussions are now taking place in London with a view to deciding how the necessary "adjustment and reconciliation" between the jurisdiction of the United States authorities and that of the local British authorities can best be arranged.

No question of the transfer of sovereignty arises. This was made clear in the Attorney General's opinion of August 27th, and has been reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons. That being so, the question to be solved would seem to be how to arrange that the United States authorities in the various territories shall obtain adequate powers to defend, control and operate their bases with the minimum disturbance to the existing British administrative and jurisdictional arrangements.

There

There is, of course, no suggestion that the United States Government should be denied any powers which they consider necessary for the proper defence or use of the bases. At the same time, it is felt that it is most important that the fullest consideration should be given to the interests and feelings of the local inhabitants and that the existing administrative and jurisdictional arrangements should only be disturbed if this is really essential for the proper defence of the American bases. While the British authorities are naturally particularly concerned to protect the interests of the local inhabitants for whose welfare they are responsible, it is felt that it is equally to the advantage of the United States authorities to see that the leases are drawn up in such a manner as to reduce to the minimum the possible causes of friction between the various parties concerned. The leases are to run for a period of 99 years, and that being so it is clearly necessary that their long term effect upon the well being of the local inhabitants should be taken into account. It would seem, however, that the instructions sent to the United States Delegates in London make it difficult for the latter to pay due account to the interests of the different territories and their inhabitants, and compel them to put forward demands for concessions or facilities which would not seem to be essential for the defence or control of the bases.

Two examples may be given. In the matter of jurisdiction the British authorities are prepared to allow the United States authorities to exercise jurisdiction over American nationals as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned and over Americans

in regard to all offences committed within the leased areas. The American Delegates have, however, been instructed to claim United States jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offences committed anywhere in the territories concerned, and as regards all offences committed in the leased areas. The exercise by the United States authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether Americans or not, in respect of all offences committed within the leased areas would not seem to be essential to the proper defence of the bases. This would not, for example, be prejudiced by an assault by one British subject on another taking place within the leased area.

As regards shipping, the British authorities have proposed that all vessels owned by the United States Government should be granted the same privileges and exemptions from harbour dues, etc. as vessels belonging to the Royal Navy. They have also proposed that the United States coastwise shipping laws should not apply to the leased areas, and that British merchant ships should therefore not be excluded from these areas and have asked that harbour facilities within the leased areas should be made available to British and other ships under certain conditions. In reply, the American Delegates have, it appears been instructed to press for the exemption of United States ships from all dues--which might place them in a more favourable position than ships in the Royal Navy--and have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.

The



The exemption of United States ships from all dues and the possible exclusion of British ships from the leased areas would again hardly seem to be essential to the defence or control of the bases.

There are other points on which similar difficulty seems to have arisen; but the broad argument that it is wished to urge is one in favour of the instructions to the United States Delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defence aspect and to take fully into account the interests of the various territories and their inhabitants.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 26th 1941.



# MEMORANDUM

In its memorandum of February 26, the British Embassy raises the following questions with respect to the negotiations concerning the lease of naval and air bases:

(1) That the United States is demanding jurisdiction over all persons, including British subjects, as regards security offenses committed within the territories concerned, and as regards all offenses committed within the leased areas. It is stated that the exercise by our authorities of jurisdiction over all persons, whether American or not, in respect of offenses committed within the leased areas, would not seem to be essential to the proper defense of the bases.

In a telegram despatched to London on February 26, the American negotiators were authorized to say that the Government of the United States would not exercise juris-

diction

dition over British subjects, except as regards offenses committed within the leased area affecting the safety of the area or the security of the United States, that is to say, offenses of a military character, including treason, sabotage, espionage, or any other offense relating to the security and protection of the United States bases, equipment, or other property, or to the operations of the Government of the United States under the power of the lease. This jurisdiction was further limited to offenses committed within the leased areas where the offender is apprehended therein.

It is believed that this undertaking fully meets the views set out in the British memorandum.

(2) The memorandum also raises the question regarding harbor and light dues to be paid by American vessels using the bases. It is contended that American public vessels should not have greater exemption than is now granted to similar ships of the Royal Navy.

As to this, it must be borne in mind (1) that

British



British public vessels of the types corresponding to United States public vessels which it is proposed to charge harbor dues, probably use ports in most of these outlying possessions only on infrequent occasions, and (2) that from the point of view of the British Government, it is largely a matter of taking money out of one pocket and putting it in the other. Consequently, the payment of harbor and light dues would be a matter of little consequence to the British, whereas American public vessels would be using the bases constantly, not only in carrying supplies, but in entering and departing for purposes of maneuver, et cetera. To require these ships to pay dues on an equal footing with ships of the Royal Navy would mean that American public vessels might be paying large sums of money into the local treasury for the use of a leased base which under the agreement they would have a perfect right to use without charge. Moreover, it has been pointed out to the British that the United States will construct and maintain lights, buoys, and other aids to navigation, and that all these facilities will be available to British ships--public and private--without charge.

It

It is not clear from the British contentions whether some reasonable contribution by American public ships to the upkeep of local aids to navigation is contemplated or whether this is a matter of raising new revenue.

There will be no increased cost in the upkeep of existing navigation facilities due to the use of local waters by American public vessels. If new revenue is the point at issue, it is easy to understand how the expenses involved in the use of these bases would amount to considerable sums annually and to huge sums over a period of 99 years.

No exemption of vessels other than those of the United States Army, Navy, Coast Guard, and Coast and Geodetic Survey is requested. As a matter of fact, there would be an increase of revenue of this type in each territory in which a base is located by reason of the fact that additional American vessels and perhaps foreign vessels will go to those territories with supplies



plies and materials for use in the construction and operation of the bases. This additional revenue will undoubtedly be considerable and is an additional argument against the taxation of these four categories of public vessels. Moreover, the amounts spent by the United States in supplying increased aids to navigation and harbor improvements will be considerable. These are points which seem to have been overlooked by the British Government.

Furthermore, the British Government seems to have overlooked the statement in the exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and Lord Lothian wherein it is stated that:

"His Majesty's Government will make available to the United States for immediate establishment and use naval and air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof"

and that

"All the bases and facilities referred to . . . . . will be . . . . . free from all rent and charges other than such compensation to be mutually agreed on to be paid by the United States in order to compensate the owners of private property

property for loss by expropriation or damage arising out of the establishment of the bases and facilities in question."

No one ever thought of charges on United States Government vessels for the privilege of entering and departing from these bases. The idea of payment of such charges is entirely negatived by the statement that the bases shall be "free from all rent and charges other than compensation to private property owners". Obviously, if there is a requirement for payment every time a ship enters or departs from one of these bases, the use of the bases is not free from charges.

(5) The British memorandum also states that the United States negotiators have made no proposals to meet the British request in regard to the United States coastwise shipping laws and facilities for British ships in the leased areas.

The American representatives in London have told the British negotiators that the United States coastwise laws would not extend to these bases but that under existing law all materials for the use of the army and navy,

except



except under certain conditions, must be carried in American vessels. These excepted conditions are, among other things, lack or non-availability of American vessels, excessive costs, et cetera, under which conditions provisions of the law may be waived by the President.

Concerning the use of the base facilities by British ships, the American representatives in London have stated that such facilities will be available to British commercial vessels on the same terms and conditions upon which they are available to United States commercial vessels.

(4) It is also stated in the memorandum that the broad argument that it is wished to urge, is one in favor of the instructions to the United States delegates being such as to enable them to treat the matters under discussion on a wide basis from the defense aspect and to take fully into account interests of the territories and their inhabitants.

Throughout the course of the negotiations in London the attitude and spirit of the Government of the United States toward the discussion of the terms of the leases and the agreements

agreements under which the bases will be operated have been entirely within the framework of the broad purposes of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, as expressed in the basic exchange of notes. Every consideration has been given at all times to meet in as far as possible the desires of the local territories, but it must be said that many of the points which have caused delay in the discussions have referred to matters in which apparently it has been the desire of the local authorities to have provisions inserted which would circumscribe the rights considered by the United States Government as necessary and in accordance with the principles laid down in the exchange of notes of September 2, 1940.

The Naval Affairs Committees of the two Houses of Congress, and individual members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, have already raised the question as to whether the United States will be required to pay any kind of charges in connection with the use of these bases and have been told that the Government of the United States does not anticipate being subjected



to any kind of charges. It would be unfortunate if the British Government, by a continuation of the discussion of such matters as customs, harbor, and light dues, should cause these Committees to gain an unfavorable impression at a time when the American Government is doing its utmost in an effort to be of assistance in the world situation.

Department of State,

Washington, March 1, 1941

*Great Britain*  
*X*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 22, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I have been asked to return the attached message from the British Prime Minister to the President.

It is my understanding that the President's reply has been sent - the pencil draft is returned herewith.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. CALLAGHAN

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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THE SECRETARY

January 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your memorandum of January sixteenth regarding the former Naval Person's message to you of January eleventh, I enclose copies of the despatches which I sent to Vichy and London, in accordance with our conversation.

CH



REGRADED <sup>via Butler</sup>  
UNCLASSIFIED

For the Prime Minister  
~~Secret~~

Delighted ship is  
coming to Annapolis &  
I can manage it & will  
go there Friday afternoon  
and meet Halifax off the  
harbor. Destroyer will  
meet her off Cape and  
act as escort. Walter  
would greatly appreciate  
it if two of our star  
admirals and one mid  
could go up bay on her  
Many thanks Frederick

COPY

January 13, 1941.

6 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

In response to the message to the President quoted in your telegram No. 117, January 11, 5 p.m., please convey the following personal reply:

QUOTE I have sent suitable instructions to the Ambassador at Vichy requesting that he make it clear to Marshal Petain that the offer came directly from you and involved more than a suggestion of assistance. In instructing the Ambassador to deliver this message to the Marshal at a suitable opportunity, I told Admiral Leahy that he should in no way give the impression of pressing for any response. ENDQUOTE

HULL

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

COPY

January 13, 1941.

5 p.m.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

VICHY.

NO DISTRIBUTION

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY.

The President has received a secret and personal message from Churchill who is apparently concerned lest the Marshal may not have fully realized that the message conveyed to him through the Chargé d'Affaires came directly from the Prime Minister and involved more than a suggestion of assistance in the event that the French Government should decide to cross to North Africa.

After consulting Matthews concerning his conversation with the French authorities on the subject (see telegram No. 1208, December 31, 7 p.m.) and when a suitable occasion may present itself, you should indicate to the Marshal that you are acquainted with the British offer. You should, however, make it clear that you are not bringing the subject up for the purpose of obtaining an expression of opinion from the Marshal but only for the purpose of making certain that he understands that it was the British Prime Minister himself who made the offer and that the Prime Minister has informed this Government that the offer involved considerably more than a suggestion of assistance. There is no intention whatsoever of pressing the Marshal for any response; but you may say to him that you are holding yourself available should the Marshal desire to pursue the matter further.

HULL

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *State Dept.*

*Letter 8/14/69*



REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated June 26, 1941

Rec'd 9:50 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2673, June 26, 11 p.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"I am concerned at the result which may follow from British and American tank design for the future proceeding on independent lines. Already the M-3 American medium tank is being produced in three types to American, British and Canadian orders. These types although basically identical vary in several respects particularly as regards main armament. You have retained the seventy five mm gun whereas we and the Canadians are going for the six--pdr gun with seventy five mm and two--pdr weapons as interim steps.

It is obvious that nothing must be done to disturb production now in hand here or in North America. We want all the tanks we can get as soon as possible.

At the same time I am impressed with the importance of strengthening the liaison between the United States of America and the British and I suggest we should evolve  
machinery

-2- #2673, June 26, 11 p.m. from London.

machinery which will ensure that future designs in each class of tank are as similar as possible thus eliminating unnecessary maintenance difficulties.

At the present moment tank design in the States is controlled by the United States Ordnance Board while in England it is controlled by our Tank Board.

I would strongly suggest for your consideration that a joint Anglo-American Tank Board should be set up in America to include Canadian as well as British representation for the purpose of controlling and coordinating tank design and production as regards new types. You will remember that Baruch and I set up an organization on similar lines to look after production at Chateau Roux in 1917.

The Tank Board in England will of course still be necessary to deal with current modifications and proposals for new types and here also I suggest that American representation should be included or a board formed similar to that suggested above. The boards here and in America would have to work in close liaison.

Our common aim you will agree must be to design much better tanks than the Nazis to be ahead in the race guns versus armour and to produce them quicker than they can. This I feel sure can only be achieved by the

closest

-3- #2673, June 26, 11 p.m. from London.

closest cooperation in design as well as in production and I think there is already ample evidence that we can learn a lot from your technicians on the mechanical side while we can possibly give you valuable advice obtained by newly bought experience as to the fighting requirements.

If you agree I would suggest that the detailed composition of the board and your representation on our board here might be discussed by your representatives with the British Army Staff and British Supply Council."

WINANT

EMB



1204

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

Following is text of message for the President from  
the Prime Minister, dated June 14th, 1941.

**~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL.**

I am much encouraged by Ghormley's letter about your marines taking over that cold place and I hope that once the first instalment have arrived you will give full publicity to it. It would give us hope to face the long haul that lies ahead. It would also produce the best effects in Spain, Vichy France and Turkey.

2. I had hoped for quicker progress in Syria but Vichy is so far putting up with what we are doing to them without taking warlike action elsewhere and I think it will be all right.

3. Winant will no doubt have told you about what I sent out to Egypt secretly to restore the balance there. This will be used to-morrow (Sunday) and as it will be the first occasion when we hope to have definite superiority in tackle both on the ground and above it, I naturally attach the very greatest importance to this venture. The above is for your own eye alone.

4. From every source at my disposal including some most trustworthy it looks as if a vast German onslaught on the Russian frontier is imminent. Not only are the main German armies deployed from Finland to Roumania but the final arrivals of air and armoured forces are being completed. The pocket battleship "Lutzow", which put her nose out of Skaggerak yesterday and was promptly torpedoed by our coastal aircraft was very likely going

North/



-2-

North to give naval strength on the Arctic flank. Should this new war break out we shall of course give all encouragement and any help we can spare to the Russians, following the principle that Hitler is the foe we have to beat. I do not expect any class political reactions here and trust that a German-Russian conflict will not cause you any embarrassment.

5. We must also take full advantage of a possible breather in the Middle East to get things in good shape there. I am looking forward to Harriman's report. Kindest regards and every wish that your indisposition may soon pass.

**REGRADED**  
**UNCLASSIFIED**

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated June 11, 1941

Rec'd 7:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2376, June 11, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND **TOP SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

"I am looking forward to welcoming your son here.  
I have been told that he has a plan to take over, equip  
and defend an air base at Bathurst in Gambia as a  
staging and servicing point for heavy United States  
bombers to be flown across the Atlantic to the  
Middle East. His idea is that United States of America  
should lease base and install naval, military and air  
defenses. Bombers would be flown from United States of  
America via Pernambuco to be serviced Bathurst, then  
flown on by American ferry pilot organization to Egypt.  
Bathurst base all American. We are wholeheartedly in  
favor of this proposal and would be prepared to give  
you a lease at Bathurst on similar terms to those already  
given for bases in the Western Atlantic. I had intended  
to postpone putting this proposal to you until I had  
talked it over with your son, but he has been delayed  
and



-2- 2376, June 11, 2 p.m., from London

and the matter is so urgent that I wanted to put it to you at once. If the proposal commands itself to you in principle, our staffs over here could work out the details."

JOHNSON

ALC

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated June 7, 1941

Rec'd 2:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

2331, June 7, 6 p.m.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON

"One. We enter Syria in some force tomorrow morning in order to prevent further German penetration. Success depends largely upon attitude of local French troops. De Gaulle's Free French outfit will be prominent but not in the van. He is issuing a proclamation to the Arabs offering in the name of France complete independence and opportunity to form either three or one or three in one free Arab states. Relations of these states with France will be fixed by treaty, safe guarding established interest somewhat on the Anglo-Egyptian model. General Catroux is not to be called High Commissioner but French Delegate and Plenipotentiary.

Two. I cannot tell how Vichy will react to what may happen. I do not, myself, think they will do much worse than they are now doing, but of course they may retaliate

-2- 2331, June 7, 1941 from London

retaliate on Gibraltar or Freetown. I should be most grateful if you would keep your pressure upon them. We have no political interests at all in Syria, except to win the war.

Three. Thank you so much for letting Harriman go to the Middle East. He is seeing your son tomorrow before leaving, and I shall see him myself, I hope, at luncheon Monday."

JOHNSON

PEG



Pres.  
Port.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

GMW

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated June 3, 1941

Rec'd 9:33 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2252, June 3, 2 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"I am finding it necessary to build up a much stronger organization of the rear ward services in the Middle East to sustain the large forces now gathering in and about the Nile Valley and an important mission is going out by air, comprising high military and civilian experts. We must consider the formation of a well equipped base, either at Port Sudan (as your son suggested) or/and at Massawa near which lies the town of Asmara with its fine buildings in order to arrange for the reception of American materials which you are sending to us in increasing quantities. American tanks and American aircraft require a good sprinkling of American civilian volunteer personnel to instruct us in their use and help keep them serviceable. I should be grateful if you would allow Averill Harriman to go out with

the

-2- 2252, June 3, 2 p.m. from London

the mission as independent observer, taking with him one or two of his own assistants. He would then be able to advise upon the best measures to be taken to ensure the most efficient use of all that you are sending. He is quite willing to go; indeed, he would like it. The trip might take him six weeks but it would be well worth it."

JOHNSON

RR

*Bof*  
JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 31, 1941

Rec'd 12:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

2233, May 31, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 1858, May 29, noon.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. Am deeply grateful to you for your proposals  
of May 29 which we at once accept in principle.

"Two. I must, of course, consult the Canadian  
Government, but I have no doubt about their response.  
The Air Ministry has been instructed to plan the reorgani-  
zation of the ferrying service in accordance with your  
views. A senior officer will be sent out at once to  
study the problem on the spot and to consult your Navy  
and War Departments.

"Three. We are bent on speeding the flow of aircraft  
from your factories to our squadrons, and the Royal  
Air Force will welcome the opportunity of working with  
officers of the United States services on this task.

"Four. We have already withdrawn the bulk of our  
troops from Crete, and I am hopeful about the others.

it

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED



-2- 2233, May 31, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE) from London

It was impossible to continue the defence of this outpost without jeopardizing the naval superiority in the eastern basin upon which the rest of the Nile campaign depends.

JOHNSON

NPL

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated May 31, 1941

Rec'd 12:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

2233, May 31, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The force and fury of the air attack was beyond anything known or expected, and as we had no airfields which could be held within fighter range the enemy's air power could work virtually unrestricted, both against the ships holding off seaborne attacks and against our troops and anti-aircraft guns ashore. The enemy has suffered very heavy losses to his high-grade personnel, in aircraft, and above all in troop carrying machines. We must expect increasing strain upon our defence of Egypt and our communications with Malta and Gibraltar. Valuable time has, however, been gained and it remains to be seen what use we can make of it.

"Five. The capture of Crete will, of course, be exploited to the full of enemy propaganda, and any open move by you like sending even a brigade to Iceland could not come at a more timely moment. See also second epistle to the Corinthians Chapter Six, Verse Two."

End Message

JOHNSON

NPL

*Buf*

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 29, 1941

Rec'd 8:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2200, May 29, midnight. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

"One. We cordially welcome your taking over Iceland at the earliest possible moment, and will hold ourselves and all our resources there at your disposal as may be found convenient. It would liberate a British division for defence against invasion or the Middle East. It would enable us to concentrate our flying boats now there on northwestern approaches. If it could be done in the next three weeks or less, or even begun, it would have a moral effect even beyond its military importance. You have only to say the word and our staffs can get to work at once.

Two. Spain and Portugal. At any time now Hitler may obtain air bases in southern Spain or in North Africa, Spanish or French, from which he can make Gibraltar harbour unuseable by our fleet. The moment this happens, or we are sure it is going to happen,

WE



-2- #2200, May 29, midnight from London. (SECTION ONE)

we shall send our expeditions which have long been prepared and are waiting beside their ships, to occupy the Grand Canary, the Cape Verde Islands and one of the Azores. The code names for these three expeditions will be cabled in a separate message.

JOHNSON

LMS

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 29, 1941

Rec'd 10:17 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

2200, May 29, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

We cannot provide an army to defend Portugal on the mainland, and the same is true of Spain, though we would try to help a guerilla there. Meanwhile we were about to offer Portuguese antiaircraft and other equipment to defend Azores and Cape Verde Islands, and were encouraging them to withdraw their Government there if overrun by the Nazis. If Salazar accepts our help and protection in the islands we would of course welcome assistance of United States support. As we are already discussing with Salazar help to Portugal, had we not better go ahead and try to obtain his approval of the idea withdrawing to the Islands? It is a matter of approach and method. These could be discussed forthwith between State Department and Foreign Office. Whatever Salazar's decision we should in the event have to obtain control of the Islands for which United States cooperation would be invaluable.

JOHNSON

CSB

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 29, 1941

Rec'd 10 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2200, May 29, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

We should welcome collaboration with an American token force, before, during or after occupation of Atlantic Islands and if you wish would turn them over to you as a matter of mutual war convenience.

Four. We should naturally welcome United States occupation of Dakar, and would afford all facilities in our power. We have some rather costly experience and knowledge of this place. Surest method by landing tanks from specially constructed vessels on neighboring beaches. I suggest that immediate consultation between your officers and ours should be given to make a workable plan, and have it ready in case circumstances should require its use. (END MESSAGE)

2200, May 29, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

JOHNSON

CSB

We should welcome collaboration with an American token force, before, during or after occupation of Atlantic Islands and if you wish would turn them over to you as a matter of mutual war convenience.

Four. We should naturally welcome United States occupation of Dakar, and would afford all facilities



REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 28, 1941

Rec'd 6:40 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

RUSH

2165, May 28, 11 p. m.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER  
NAVAL PERSON.

"We are uplifted and fortified by your memorable declaration and by the far-reaching executive measures involved in the state of emergency you have proclaimed. Pray accept, Mr. President, my heartfelt thanks. It was very kind of you to let me know before hand of the great advance you found it possible to make.

I have now also received your message about the impressive additional output you are sending to the Middle East in United States ships. Winant will tell you what I managed to send out there secretly and the hopes I have of some good news coming to hand before long.

It seems most important to find the PRINZ EUGEN before she cuts in to our convoys. The Admiralty and Ghormley are in the closest touch. But this is a new, very fast and powerful ship, and there is much danger

while

-2- #2165, From London, May 28, 11 p. m.

while she is at large for any convoy unprotected by battleship escort.

I will send you later the inside story of the fighting with the BISMARCK. She was a terrific ship and a masterpiece of naval construction. Her removal eases our battleship situation as we should have had to keep KING GEORGE FIFTH, PRINCE OF WALES and the two NELSONS practically tied to Scapa Flow to guard against a sortie of BISMARCK and TIRPITZ as they could choose their moment and we should have to allow for one of our ships refitting. Now it is a different story. The effect upon the Japanese will be highly beneficial. I expect they are doing all their sums again."

JOHNSON

HPD

*Boy*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS  
FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND  
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

*Many thanks -  
Betty -*



Pres

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 23, 1941

Rec'd 6:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

2065, May 23, noon.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER  
NAVAL PERSON.

One. The Admiralty have asked me to send you the two attached papers "A" and "B". The first is technical and the second speaks for itself.

Two. Battle in Crete is severe because, having no airfields within effective range, we cannot bring any airforce into action either to aid defense or protect patrolling squadrons. Two of our cruisers and two destroyers sunk today. We are destroying many of highest class German troops and have sunk at least one convoy.

Three. Yesterday, twenty-first, BISMARCK, PRINCE EUGEN and eight merchant ships located in Bergen. Low clouds prevented air attack. Tonight they have sailed. We have reason to believe that a formidable

Atlantic

-2- Triple Priority #2065, May 23, noon from London.

Atlantic raid is intended. Should we fail to catch them going out your Navy should surely be able to mark them down for us. KING GEORGE V, PRINCE OF WALES, HOOD, REPULSE and aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS with auxillary vessels will be on their track. Give us the news and we will finish them off. W.S.C.

The two enclosures A and B referred to in numbered paragraph One are lengthy and have been sent through Navy channels in order to save time. Admiral Gornley has requested the Navy Department to forward the texts immediately to you for the President.

WINANT

NK

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY

Attached are papers "A"  
and "B" mentioned in  
telegram no. 2065 of  
May 23, noon from  
London sent to the  
President at 9:25 a.m.  
May 23.

Barl.



23 MAY 1941

(SHEET ONE-ANNEX "A")

~~SECRET~~

THE PRIME MINISTER IS SENDING A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT. REFER TO THE AMBASSADOR'S DISPATCH OF 12 NOON MAY 23RD, DISPATCH NUMBER 2065.

THE REMAINDER OF THIS DISPATCH IS TO BE CONSIDERED ANNEX "A" TO THAT MESSAGE, AND MY 231037 IS ANNEX "B" TO THAT MESSAGE. PLEASE DELIVER THEM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE PRESIDENT.

ANNEX "A": 1. IT IS CONSIDERED THAT THE PATROLS WHICH ARE AT PRESENT BEING OPERATED BY THE UNITED STATES IN AREAS 1, 2, AND 3 HAVE BEEN OF GREAT VALUE, BUT THE SITUATION HAS NOW MATERIALLY CHANGED IN THESE WAYS: (A) SUBMARINES HAVE STARTED NOW TO OPERATE WEST OF 40 DEGREES WEST IN AREA 1. (B) ATTACKS BY HEAVY SURFACE UNITS ON OUR TRADE AT AN EARLY DATE ARE EXPECTED.

2. SUBMARINE ATTACKS IN AREA ONE. UP TO NOW WE HAVE ONLY BEEN ESCORTING OUR HALIFAX-UNITED KINGDOM CONVOYS TO 35 DEGREES WEST.

CONT'D.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

(SHEET TWO)

~~SECRET~~

IT WILL NOW BE NECESSARY TO ESCORT THESE CONVOYS OVER THE ENTIRE ROUTE, AND THIS WILL NECESSARILY REDUCE GREATLY THE SCALE OF DEFENSE WHICH CAN BE PROVIDED TO EACH CONVOY. SURFACE RAIDER ATTACKS. AGAINST THIS FORM OF ATTACK, OUR BATTLE FLEET WHICH IS SMALL CAN ONLY OFFER AN INADEQUATE SCALE OF PROTECTION. WE HAVE, UP TO NOW, MADE IT A POLICY TO FURNISH BATTLE SHIP PROTECTION FROM HALIFAX TO 40 DEGREES TO AS MANY CONVOYS AS POSSIBLE.

3. IF THE UNITED STATES FORCES OPERATING IN AREA ONE COULD COVER THE AREA THROUGH WHICH OUR VESSELS USUALLY PASS FOR THE PURPOSE OF, FIRSTLY, MAKING SUBMARINES AND SURFACE RAIDERS FEEL INSECURE; AND, SECONDLY, REPORTING ENEMY UNIT'S POSITIONS WHEN SIGHTED SO THAT OUR SURFACE FORCES MIGHT BRING THE ENEMY FORCES TO ACTION AND OUR MERCHANT VESSELS ROUTED OVER ANOTHER ROUTE, IT WOULD BE OF GREAT ASSISTANCE IN MEETING THE AFOREMENTIONED THREATS. OF PARTICULAR VALUE WOULD BE AIR RECONNAISSANCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE CONVOYS, AND IT MAY BE SAID THAT IN GENERAL THE CLOSER THE U.S.

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

(SHEET THREE- ANNEX "A")

FORCES WORK TO A CONVOY, THE MORE IT WILL HELP TO PROTECT THE CONVOY.

4. THE UNITED STATES PATROLS WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST  
SECONDARILY TO THAT IN  
VALUE IN AREAS "X" AND ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~ AREA "Y" AS  
GIVEN IN THE ATTACHED NOTE.

5. AREA 2. THE TRACKS WHICH ARE BEING FOLLOWED BY U.S.  
FORCES IN AREA 2 ARE BEING RECEIVED, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THEY  
COVER THE AREA THOROUGHLY. THE BRITISH HAVE ASSIGNED A CRUISER TO  
CRUISE IN THE VICINITY OF THE U.S. FORCES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACTING  
AS A "KILLING FORCE."

6. AREA 3. SUBMARINES HAVING NOW SPREAD THEMSELVES ON  
A LINE BETWEEN FREETOWN AND NORTHEASTERN CORNER OF BRAZIL, THIS AREA  
HAS THUS RECENTLY BECOME VERY CRITICAL. THE U-BOATS HAVE TAKEN HEAVY  
TOLLS OF OUR SHIPPING, AND IT IS SUSPECTED THAT THE ITALIAN AIR  
LINE FROM CAPE VERDE ISLANDS TO BRAZIL IS RENDERING THEM ASSISTANCE.  
IN SECTIONS OF THIS AREA IN WHICH THERE ARE CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF  
SHIPPING, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ENEMY SURFACE RAIDERS MAY ALSO  
OPERATE.

CONTINUED.

~~SECRET~~

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**



REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

(SHEET FOUR-ANNEX "A")

7. AREA "2" GIVEN ON THE ATTACHED NOTE IS THE AREA IN WHICH THE U.S. FORCES WOULD BE OF THE GREATEST ASSISTANCE IN FULFILLING THE ABOVE OBJECTS. IT IS NOW INTENDED SOON TO STATION A CRUISER AS AN ATTACKING FORCE IN THE VICINITY OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN THIS AREA.

AREA "X" 63 DEGREES NORTH, 35 DEGREES WEST; 57 N., 35 W.; 50 DEGREES NORTH, 47 DEGREES 30 MINS. WEST; 63 N., 38 W.

AREA "Y" 50 N., 39 W.; 36 N., 45 W.; 35 N., 50 W.; 45-30 N., 50 W.; 50 N., 47-30 W.

AREA "Z" 15 N., 26 W.; EQUATOR, 26 W.; EQUATOR, 35 W.; 10 N., 50 W.

THIS IS THE END OF ANNEX "A"

ACTION: STATE.....

FILE.....

CNO....

CR 534

~~SECRET~~

(ANNEX BAKER-SHEET 11) 23 MAY 1941

DATE	NATIONALITY	NAME OF VESSEL	LONGITUDE	TONNAGE	CARGO
20 APR.	BRITISH	CALCHAS	27-00 W.	10,305	UNDETERMINED
30 APR.	BRITISH	LASSE	28-56 W.	7,417	OUTWARD BOUND
3 MAY	NORWEGIAN	TARANGER	25-20 W.	4,873	OUTWARD BOUND
6 MAY	BRITISH	OAKDENE	27-51 W.	4,255	OUTWARD BOUND
8 MAY	BRITISH	RAMILLIES	30-52 W.	4,553	OUTWARD BOUND
9 MAY	BRITISH	BENGORE HEAD	32-40 W.	2,609	OUTWARD BOUND
9 MAY	BRITISH	ESMOND	32-40 W.	5,029	OUTWARD BOUND
9 MAY	BRITISH	GREGALIA	32-40 W.	5,802	OUTWARD BOUND
9 MAY	BRITISH	EMPIRE CLOUD	32-40 W.	5,968	OUTWARD BOUND
9 MAY	BRITISH	CITY OF WINCHESTER	26-14 W.	7,120	OUTWARD BOUND
10 MAY	DUTCH	HERCULES	34-28 W.	2,317	OUTWARD BOUND
13 MAY	BRITISH	SOMERSBY	26-13 W.	5,170	GRAIN.
20 MAY	BRITISH	HARPAGOS	41-00 W.	5,173	WHEAT.
20 MAY	BRITISH	NORMAN MONARCH	41-00 W.	4,718	GRAIN.
20 MAY	BRITISH	DARLINGTON COURT	41-00 W.	5,356	PAPER, 5 PLANES, 1000 MACHINE GUNS.
20 MAY	BRITISH	BRITISH SECURITY	41-00 W.	8,470	TANKER.

(SHEET TWO-ANNEX "B")

THIS IS ANNEX "B" TO DISPATCH TRANSMITTED THROUGH STATE DEPARTMENT;  
BETWEEN MARCH 31 AND MAY 20, FOLLOWING SHIPS SUNK WEST OF 26 DEG. W:

DATE	NATIONALITY	NAME OF VESSEL	LONGITUDE	TONNAGE	CARGO
31 MARCH	SWEDISH	CASTOR	32-08 WEST	8914	TANKER FOR SWEDEN.
2 APRIL	BRITISH	BEAVERDALE	29-16 WEST	9957	516 TONS TNT,
		98 TRUCKS, GENERAL, 4 PLANES,			192 TONS AMMUNITION.
4 APRIL	BRITISH	BRITISH RELIANCE	28-09 WEST	7000	TANKER
4 APRIL	BRITISH	ALDERPOOL	27-59 WEST	4313	GRAIN
4 APRIL	BRITISH	BRITISH VISCOUNT	27-30 WEST	6895	TANKER
4 APRIL	GREEK	LEONIDA Z. CAMBANIST	27-30 WEST	4274	GRAIN
4 APRIL	BRITISH	WESTPOOL	27-30 W.	5724	SCRAP IRON.
4 APRIL	BRITISH	THIRLBY	28-12 W.	4887	WHEAT
4 APRIL	BELGIAN	INDIER	27-30 W.	5409	STEEL
6 APRIL	NORWEGIAN	LINCOLN ELSWORTH	27-06 W.	5580	BALLAST
10 APRIL	DUTCH	SALEIER	30-48 W.	6563	OUTWARD BOUND.
12 APRIL	BELGIAN	VILLE D' LIEGE	29-50 W.	7463	GENERAL,
		2,862,600 ROUNDS SMALL ARMS AMUN,			20 AEROPLANE ENGINES,
		SEVENTY FOUR TON TRUCKS.			



THIS IS ANNEX "B" SHEET THREE.

DATE	NATIONALITY	NAME OF VESSEL	LONGITUDE	TONNAGE	CARGO
20 MAY	NORWEGIAN	JOHN P. PEDERSEN	41-00 W.	6,128	ADMTY TANKER
20 MAY	DUTCH	ELUSA	38-00 W.	6,235	TANKER
20 MAY	BRITISH	SAN FELIX	40-20 W.	13,037	TANKER IN BALLAST.
21 MAY	(UNKNOWN BRITISH SHIP) (LONG, TONNAGE & CARGO ALSO UNKNOWN)				
20 MAY	BRITISH	ROTHERMERE	41-40 W.	5,356	PAPER
20 MAY	BELGIAN	GUNG	37-30 W.	5,086	OUTWARD BOUND

THIS IS THE END OF ANNEX "B"

DIST. STATE.....

FILE.....

CNO.....

CR533

Pres  
But  
REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SO)

LONDON

Dated May 19, 1941

Rec'd 7:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1992, May 19, noon. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

While at Chequers last night the following message came in. I understand it was sent through the British Consulate General at New York.

"Following for Prime Minister from Wendell Willkie:

I send you this because of my great concern about American public opinion which is hesitant and confused by present issue. I returned advocating destroyers for Britain after talk with you and Alexander. Donovan returned advocating convoys after talk with authorities in England. Forrestal now returns presumably after similar conversations saying that convoys not necessary and that bombers are sufficient. I am fearful that this policy places your friends outside administration in untenable positions. Obviously your policy must be flexible and constantly changing but might there not be some method through your representatives here to keep your friends

-2- 1992, May 19, noon (SEC ONE) from London

friends advised as to changes of needs?

My affectionate and respectful regards."

The Prime Minister wrote the following reply but wanted to be sure that it would not in any way embarrass you and so we agreed that I should send it on to you in case you had any suggestions to make before its dispatch from here. He said that he would appreciate very much a prompt answer."

Prime Minister to Mr. Wendell Willkie through Consul General New York:

WINANT

RR

JT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 19, 1941

Rec'd 7:50 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1992, May 19, noon. (SECTION TWO)

One. There has been no change in our attitude. We want destroyers and long range bombers but far more we want effective convoy to farthest possible point. Feel sure Forrestal must have been misreported in saying anything contrary to this.

Two. Merely taking American numitions sunk is no measure of the danger. Loss of tonnage is enormous and any success we have in giving special protection to valuable convoys from United States is paid for by other losses in Atlantic off Freetown or in other waters or by diminution of our war effort in Mediterranean. I have never said that the British Empire cannot make its way out of this war without American belligerence, but no peace that is any use to you or which will liberate Europe can be obtained without American belligerence towards which convoy is a decisive step. Every day's delay adds to the length of the war and the difficulties to be encountered. West Africa, Spain, Vichy, Turkey, the

Arab



-2- 1992. May 19, noon (SECTION TWO) from London

Arab world all hang in the balance. Japan hangs in the balance. Wait three months and all this may be piled up against us in an adverse sense thus lengthening the war to periods no man can pretend to know about and increasing immensely the danger and burden to be borne by someone before Hitler's defeat. How easy now—how hard a year hence will be the task.

WINANT

RR

JT  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SO)

LONDON

Dated May 19, 1941

Rec'd 8 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1992, May 19, noon. (SECTION THREE)

Three. At present rate in next twelve months we shall lose four and half million tons of shipping. The United States by a prodigy of generous constructive effort will build perhaps three and a half and we build the other million. Where have we got to then? Just making time and swimming level with the bank against the stream. Whereas cooperation of even a third of the American Navy would save at least one-half of the tonnage beforehand and give that mastery which alone can abridge the torment of mankind.

Four. Most grateful to you for your cable."

WINANT

HTM

Pres.      Bof

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

JR

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated May 14, 1941

Rec'd 9 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH.

1909, May 14, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Thank you so much for your very kind message and I hope you will soon be quite well again. I have good hopes that in view of certain steps we have taken, the situation in Libya will be improved before long. It is, therefore, particularly important for you to go forward confidently with all your plans for supplying our Middle Eastern Armies by American ships to Suez. In Iraq too we are trying to regain control and anyhow we are making a large strong bridgehead at Basra where later on in the war American machines may be assembled and supplies unloaded. Syria is, however, a cause of great anxiety. There is no doubt that Darlan will sell the pass if he can, and German aircraft are already passing into Iraq. I have no means of action on that Caitiff Government. The more Leahy can do, the better.

It

-2- #1909, May 14, 1 p.m., from London.

It is the only hope. We are also sure Vichy is letting transport, etc., go to Tripoli overland from Tunis. The Azores and Cape Verde Islands are always liable to be jumped by the Germans at the same time as they break into Spain or seduce the Spanish Government. It will be very difficult for us to avoid being either too soon or too late. Finally, one of our armed merchant cruisers was torpedoed this morning between the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth meridians. I will send you a special report about these shortly."

WINANT

PEG



RDS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 10, 1941

Rec'd 3:38 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

1855, May 10, 5 p.m.

**SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL  
PERSON.

"I expect you are now acquainted with the splendid offer which General Arnold made to us of one third of the rapidly expanding capacity for pilot training in the United States to be filled with pupils from here. We have made active preparations and the first 5504 young men are now ready to leave as training was to have begun early next month. A second batch of 550 will follow quickly on their heels. I now understand there are legal difficulties. I hope, Mr. President, that these are not serious as it would be very disappointing to us and would upset our arrangements if there were now to be delay. General Arnold's offer was an unexpected and very welcome addition to our training facilities. Such ready made capacity of aircraft, airfields and instructors all in balance we could not obtain to the same extent and in the same time by any other means. It will greatly accelerate our effort in the air."

WINANT

EMB

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 3, 1941

Rec'd 12:40 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH

1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION ONE)

Department's 1471, May 1, 9 p.m.

FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT.

One. Your friendly message assured me that no temporary reverses, however heavy, can shake your resolution to support us until we gain the final victory. I quite see your difficulties about paragraph one so far as visits are concerned but the consequences reflect themselves upon paragraph two.

Two. The conditions in your first sentence of this paragraph (paragraph two) make it almost certain that we shall be forestalled. We ourselves are deeply impressed by those conditions, but on the other hand how are we to deal with German penetration by tourists and agents ready for some fine day when a German armed expedition will arrive finding all prepared beforehand. The terror which Germany exercises on the Governments of Portugal  
and

-2- #1753, May 3, midnight, rush section one.

and Spain forces them to take no notice of infiltration in these islands lest worse befall them at home. You may be sure that they will try to synchronize any decisive move from Spain or Portugal with a stroke on the islands. We have taken no decision yet but I am sure you would not wish to prescribe our remaining passive, if we feel we have to act in advance of the conditions set forth in the first sentence of your paragraph two.

Three. Should we decide to move against these islands not only would we declare that they are occupied only for the purpose of British defense and not for permanent occupation and that we will restore the islands to Portuguese sovereignty at the close of the war if Portugal is restored as an independent nation, but we should be perfectly ready that the United States should stand guarantor for the execution of such an engagement. We are far from wishing to add to our territory, but only to preserve our life and perhaps yours.

WINANT

CSB



WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 3, 1941

Rec'd 4:15 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION TWO)

Four. Your paragraph three. We must not be too sure that the consequences of the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would not be grave. It would seriously increase the hazards of the Atlantic and Pacific and could hardly fail to prolong the war with all the suffering and military dangers that this would entail. We shall fight on whatever happens, but please remember that the attitude of Spain, Vichy, Turkey, and Japan may be finally determined by the outcome of the struggle in this theater of war. I cannot take the view that the loss of Egypt and the Middle East would be a mere preliminary to the successful maintenance of a prolonged oceanic war. If all Europe, the greater part of Asia and Africa became, either by conquest or agreement under duress, a part of the Axis system, a war maintained by the British Isles, the United States, Canada, and Australia against this mighty agglomeration would be a hard, long, and bleak proposition



-2- #1753, May 3, midnight, section two from London.

proposition. Therefore, if you cannot take more advanced positions now or very soon, the vast balances may be tilted heavily to our disadvantage. Mr. President, I am sure that you will not misunderstand me if I speak to you exactly what is in my mind. The one decisive counterweight I can see to balance the growing pessimism in Turkey, the Near East, and in Spain, would be if the United States were immediately to range herself with us as a belligerent power. If this were possible I have little doubt that we could hold the situation in the Mediterranean until the weight of your munitions gained the day.

WINANT

CSB

WT

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated May 3, 1941

Rec'd 2:50 a.m., 4th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

1753, May 3, midnight. (SECTION THREE)

Five. We are determined to fight to the last inch and ounce for Egypt, including its outposts of Tobruk and Crete. Very considerable risks are being run by us for that and personally I think we shall win in spite of the physical difficulties of reinforcing by tanks and air. But I adjure you, Mr. President, not to under-rate the gravity of the consequences which may follow from a middle eastern collapse; in this war every post is a winning post and how many more are we going to lose?

Six. With regard to Vichy we are more than willing that you should take the lead, and work out how to get the best from them by threats or favors. You alone can forestall the Germans in Morocco. If they are once installed it will not be necessary for them to go over-land; they will soon get air borne troops to Dakar.

Seven. I shall await with deep anxiety the new broadcast which you contemplate. It may be the supreme turning

-2- #1753, May 3, midnight, from London. Section three.

turning point.

Eight. Let me thank you for the splendid help in shipping and tankers which we owe to your action, and for all your generous and bold assistance to us and to the common cause. (END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

CSB

REF  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated April 16, 1941.

Rec'd 9:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

1515, April 16, 11 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. I had intended to cable you more fully on your momentous message about the Atlantic. Admiralty received the news with the greatest relief and satisfaction and have prepared a technical paper. They wonder whether since Admiral Gormley arrives here in about two days it would be better to discuss this with him before despatch. I do not know whether he is appraised or not. The matter is certainly of highest urgency and consequence. There are about 15 U-boats now operating on the 30th meridian and of course, United States flying boats working from Greenland would be a most useful immediate measure.

Two. Cannot tell what will happen in Greece and we have never underrated the enormous power of the German  
military



-2- 1515, April 16, 11 p.m. from London (SECTION ONE)

military machine on the mainland of Europe. We are not able to send ships to Cattaro to bring away Yugoslav refugees because of even more claimant commitments and because of the air and naval strength of the enemy in the Adriatic.

WINANT

LMS

CK  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated April 16, 1941

Rec'd 10;14 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1515, April 16, 11 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. I am personally not unduly anxious about the  
Libyan-Egyptian position. We estimate Germans have  
one colonial armoured division and perhaps the whole  
of one ordinary armoured division comprising say 600  
to 650 tanks of which a good many have already been des-  
troyed or have broken down. There are no German infantry  
in Cyrenaica except the few battalions comprised in  
the German-armoured divisions. Difficulties of supply  
of petrol, food, water, and ammunition must be severe  
and we know from prisoners of the strain under which these  
audacious formations are working. We are naturally  
trying to bring our own armoured forces which were  
largely refitting at the time of the attack into action  
and are reinforcing Egypt from all parts of the middle  
East where we have nearly half a million men. Tobruk I

regard

-2-#1515, April 16, 11 p.m. (Section Two) from London.  
regard as an invaluable bridgehead or sally port. We  
do not feel at all outmatched at present in the air and  
are growing stronger constantly. The whole power of  
the Mediterranean fleet which is being strongly re-  
inforced will be used to cut the sea and coastal  
communications. There are of course Italian forces  
besides the Germans and we believe the Germans are now  
sending or trying to send a third armoured division  
from Sicily.

Four. The repulse of the German attacks on  
Tobruk on the 14th and 15th seems to me important as this  
small fierce fight in which the enemy lost prisoners,  
killed, and tanks, together with aircraft, out of  
all proportion to our losses, is the first time they  
have tasted defeat and they are working on very small  
margins.

WINANT

LMS

LMS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated April 16, 1941

Rec'd 10:16 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1515, April 16, 11 p. m. (SECTION THREE)

Meanwhile our efforts to turn off the tap have met with a noteworthy success in the Mediterranean. Our destroyers from Malta in the early hours of this morning, 16th, caught a German-Italian convoy of five large ships loaded with ammunition and mechanical transport and escorted by three Italian destroyers. The whole convoy and all its escort were sunk. We lost one destroyer in the fight. We are keeping the strength of our forces secret for the present.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WINANT

LMS





BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2nd April, 1941.

*file*  
Dear Mr. President,

I was on the point of asking whether I might have an opportunity of seeing you tomorrow or the next day for a short talk when I got the enclosed message from the Prime Minister.

You will see that it relates to the earlier message that he sent to you through your Embassy in London concerning the movement of the French battleship "Dunkerque".

If you can see me tomorrow or Friday, perhaps you would be good enough to have your Secretary let me know.

*Yours very sincerely  
Halifax*

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

"Please at once tell the President that in any communication Admiral Leahy may be instructed to make to French Government it would be desirable to make no mention of "permission" being obtained from armistice commission or of escort to be provided for "Dunkerque" as this might give away our source.

It would be sufficient for him to say that information had been received showing that there was the intention to send "Dunkerque" to Toulon for repairs in near future."

2nd April, 1941

*file  
confidential*

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated April 2, 1941

Rec'd 4:33 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1282, April 2, 6 p.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM FORMER  
NAVAL PERSON.

"One. We have entirely authentic secret information that Vichy Government have received 'permission' from Armistice Commission to transfer battleships 'DUNKERQUE', with escort protection of the whole 'STRASBURG' group, from Oran to Toulon for 'disarmament'. Transfer will begin on fourth April.

Two. It seems certain that object of transfer is to effect repairs, and we must of course assume it is being done on German orders.

Three. I do not need to point out to you the grave danger to which this exposes us. The menace from German surface raiders is already great enough. The addition of such a vessel to the raiding fleet would set us a hard problem indeed. If any value were to be attached to Admiral Darlan's word, it might be hoped that he would in the last resort order out of French metropolitan ports

naval

-2- 1282, April 2, 1941, 6 p.m. from London

naval units ready for sea. But if 'DUNKERQUE' is docked and immobilized for repairs, that gives the Germans time to swoop and gain possession of her.

Four. I fear this is a sinister confirmation of our worst suspicions of Darlan.

Five. You have already, through your Ambassador in Vichy, indicated to the French Government that negotiations for the supply of grain to unoccupied France would be greatly facilitated if French warships in metropolitan ports were gradually transferred to North African Atlantic ports. Here we have Darlan not merely failing to comply with your wishes, but deliberately flying in the face of them.

Six. I earnestly hope that you may at once indicate to Marshal Petain that, if Darlan persists in this action, he will be cutting off relief from his country and finally forfeiting American sympathy. We ourselves in this situation could, of course, lend no assistance to the revictualling of France. There may be just a chance that Marshal Petain may deter him from this action, but if not, the matter for us is so vital that we may, even in spite of all the dangerous implications, have to make an effort to intercept and sink this vessel. I should like to hear from you that you would understand the necessity for such a step.

Seven.



-3- 1282, April 2, 1941, 6 p.m. from London

SEVEN. It is, of course, of first importance that neither the French or their masters should guess the source of the information or be made aware that we might take the drastic action mentioned in paragraph six."

WINANT

JRL

NPL



*File  
Personal*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 17th 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of  
a message for you from the Prime Minister.  
This was telegraphed to the Embassy this  
morning.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

MESSAGE FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR PRESIDENT

DATED MARCH 17th 1941.

Pray accept my most sincere congratulations and grateful thanks on your magnificent speech. It is a trumpet call to free men all over the world, and will play a weighty part in drawing them together. I must also thank you for your most kind and complimentary reference to me.



**SECRET**

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

12th March, 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein the text of a message for  
you from the Prime Minister, which was received at the  
Embassy this evening.

I am,

dear Mr. President,

Yours sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States. \_\_\_\_\_

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**





MESSAGE FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

Admiral Darlan's declaration and threat make me wonder whether it would not be best for you to intervene as a friend of both sides and try to bring about a working agreement. We do not wish to push things to extremes, and we naturally should be most reluctant in a thing like this to act against your judgment after you have weighed all the pros and cons. We fear very much prolongation of the war and its miseries which would result from breakdown of blockade of Germany and there are immense difficulties in preventing Germany from profiting directly or indirectly from anything imported into unoccupied France. Dealing with Darlan is dealing with Germany, for he will not be allowed to agree to anything they know about which does not suit their book. Also there is the danger of rationing spreading to occupied France, Belgium, Holland and Norway. Perhaps however you might be able to devise a scheme under which supervision would limit leakage and might also give you a number of agents in favourable positions in unoccupied France and in French Africa. It would be easier for you to talk to Vichy with whom you are in regular diplomatic relations, than for us to negotiate via Madrid or by making speeches on broadcast. Besides this, Darlan has old scores to pay out against us in the dire action we were forced to take against his ships.

Would you therefore consider coming forward on the basis of how shocked you were at the idea of fighting breaking out between France and Great Britain, which would only help the common foe. Then you might be able to procure Vichy assent to a scheme allowing a ration of wheat to go through, month by month to unoccupied France and something for French Africa as long as other things were satisfactory. These other things

might /



might form the subject of a secret arrangement of which the Germans will not know, by which German infiltration into Morocco and French African ports would be limited to the bare armistice terms, and by which an increasing number of French warships would gradually be moving from Toulon to Casablanca or Dakar.

I have asked the Foreign Office to telegraph to Lord Halifax all sorts of things we think should be taken care of, so that he can tell you about them, but the two I have mentioned are worth more to us than the disadvantages of a certain amount of leakage of food to the enemy. It would have to be made clear that the relief accorded was limited to stated quantities of food at agreed intervals and did not extend to other goods. For instance, there is a French ship, the "Bangkok", with 3,000 tons of rubber on board which is certainly not all for teats of babies' bottles, and we have abundant cases of all kinds of valuable munition materials which are going straight through France to Germany or Italy, not entirely without some greasing. Moreover, it would be a great pity if any large number of ships which are all needed for our life and war effort were used up in food carrying. I do not want the people here, who, apart from the heavy bombardment likely to be renewed soon, are having to tighten their belts and restrict their few remaining comforts, to feel that I am not doing my best against the enemy. Nevertheless if it were not unwelcome I would gladly invite you to act as intermediary and make the best plan you can to beat Hitler. We have supreme confidence in you, and would receive with profound respect what you thought best to do.

The bases question has, I think, been tidied up, and I hope to bring an agreed document before the Cabinet tomorrow, Thursday, afternoon. Will you let me know when you would like the announcement to be made? Does it matter if it comes on morrow of passing of Lease-Lend Bill?



PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 10th, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of a Personal and Most Secret message from the Prime Minister which has just been received at the Embassy. The second half of this message, which deals with a different subject, has been received in corrupt form, but will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.

I have been instructed in forwarding this message to you to make it clear that in case the United States Government should contemplate giving His Majesty's Government diplomatic support in Angora, Moscow and Belgrade on the lines suggested by the Prime Minister, it is most important that the United States representatives in those capitals should say nothing about the British military move towards the Balkans.

Believe me,  
Dear Mr. President,  
Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the  
United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED





REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~

I must now tell you what we have resolved about Greece. Although it was no doubt tempting to push on from Benghazi to Tripoli, and we may still use considerable forces in this direction, we have felt it our duty to stand with the Greeks who have declared to us their resolve, even alone, to resist the German invader. Our Generals Wavell and Dill, who have accompanied Mr. Eden to Cairo, after heart-searching discussions with us, believe that we have a good fighting chance. We are therefore sending the greater part of the Army of the Nile to Greece, and are reinforcing to the utmost possible in the air. Smuts is sending South Africans to the Delta. Mr. President, you can judge these hazards for yourself. At this juncture the action of Yugoslavia is cardinal. No country ever had such a military chance. If they will fall on the Italian rear in Albania there is no measuring what might happen in a few weeks. The whole situation might be transformed, and the action of Turkey also decided in our favour. One has the feeling that Russia, though actuated mainly by fear, might at least give some reassurance to Turkey about not pressing her in the Caucasus or turning against her in the Black Sea. I need scarcely say that concerted influence of your Ambassadors in Turkey, Russia and above all in Yugoslavia, would be of enormous value at the moment, and indeed might possibly turn the scales.

In this connexion I must thank you for the magnificent work done by Donovan in his prolonged tour of the Balkans and the Middle East. He has carried

with/





with him throughout an animating heart-warming flame.

1307  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

C.H.

Just came - What  
do you think? Let  
me know in morning -  
Please return for my  
film

Filip



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the letter from the British Ambassador to you of March 10, enclosing a message from Mr. Churchill on the situation in the Near East and suggesting certain approaches by our diplomatic missions in Ankara, Moscow, and Belgrade to the governments of those respective countries, I have closely canvassed the Near Eastern situation during the recent fast-developing weeks and have come to the following conclusions as far as concerns the attitude of this Government in the premises.

As you know, we have sent several messages personally from you to the Chiefs of State of the Balkan countries and Turkey, and also from this Department to the Chiefs of Government in those same countries, making clear our attitude of aid to Britain and the application  
of

The President,

The White House.

of all the vast resources and production of this country to the assistance of Britain and those countries defending themselves against the attack of the forces of conquest. I am satisfied that we here, and our representatives in that area have done everything that could possibly be done to bolster up the resistance of the Balkan governments to penetration and occupation by the German forces. I, myself, and through my associates here, have been in constant touch with the representatives of the Balkan nations in this capital and have sought their advice and counsel as to any steps we might take to be helpful to them in this situation. I have been told by those representatives here, and I believe this to be true, that the only further step which can be of real help in these developments would be the promise on the part of the British Government to lend material military aid with air force and ground forces to the Yugoslav and the Turkish Governments in the event they find it necessary to resist the entrance or passage of German troops.


I have even taken the occasion of the visit of the British Ambassador on Monday afternoon to transmit to him this final suggestion.

As



As I said before, I feel that we have done everything this Government can possibly do in the present circumstances, but I shall not fail to continue to study the situation with a view to making any further recommendations as developments arise.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hall". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hall". The signature is enclosed in a large, sweeping loop that starts under the first letter and ends under the last letter.



*Burke*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 11th, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein in its correct form the second half of the message from the Prime Minister which I sent you yesterday afternoon.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.



I have been working steadily about the bases on turning the mountains back into molehills, but even so, the molehills remain to be disposed of. I hope to send you a cable on Monday leaving very little that is not cleared away. Please lend a hand with the shovel if you can. Remember it is the inflexible policy of His Majesty's Government, with or without any reciprocal consideration, to make sure that the United States has full, effective military security both in war and in necessary peacetime preparations for war in these Islands and areas. Give us the best chance you can to bring the local people along, for after all these Islands are their only home, and I want them to be your friends as well as ours.

The sinkings are bad and the strain is increasing at sea. Ends.



*file  
personal*

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 9th 1941.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein a copy of  
a message for you from the Prime Minister  
which I have just received by telegram.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.



MESSAGE RECEIVED FROM PRIME MINISTER FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

DATED MARCH 9th 1941.

"Our blessings from the whole British Empire  
go out to you and the American nation for this  
very present help in time of trouble."



**SECRET**

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

January 21st, 1941

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose a message from  
the Prime Minister for you which reached  
me by telegram yesterday evening.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Yours very sincerely,

*David Butler*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D.C.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**



Following is text of message from the Prime  
Minister to the President.

-----

**SECRET**

You probably know that Lord Halifax  
will arrive at Annapolis in our new battleship  
H.M.S. "KING GEORGE V." She cannot, of  
course, stay more than twenty-four hours. I  
do not know whether you would be interested  
to see her. We should be proud to show her  
to you or to any of your high naval authorities,  
if you could arrange this. She is due at the  
entrance to Chesapeake Bay at seven a.m.  
January 24th. If you will communicate to me  
any suggestions or wishes, we will do our best  
to meet them.

-----

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

38-56  
EH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 13, 1941

Rec'd 7:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

134, January 13, 9 p.m.

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Hopkins and I spent the weekend together and he is coming along with me on a short tour of fleet bases, so we shall have plenty of time to cover all points at leisure. I am most grateful to you for sending so remarkable an envoy who enjoys so high a measure of your intimacy and confidence".

JOHNSON

EP



CK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated January 11, 1941

Rec'd 5:37 p.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

117, January 11, 5 p.m.

**MOST SECRET** FOR THE SECRETARY AND THE UNDER SECRETARY.

Department's 13, January 2 5 p.m., and my 4232, December 8, 11 p.m.

Following **Secret** and personal message for the President from Former Naval Person.

"You will doubtless have been informed by State Department of the delivery to Marshal Petain of a personal message which I sent the latter.

It seems from the report on this subject of your Charge d' Affairs in Vichy, that the Marshal may not have realized that the message was one from myself and that it involved considerably more than a suggestion of assistance in the event of the French Government deciding to cross to North Africa. The Marshal was no doubt too much embarrassed by the presence of

H.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

-2-#117, January 11, 5 p.m. from London,  
M. Flandin to give as much attention to it as he might  
otherwise have done.

Would you think it possible and desirable to  
instruct your Ambassador at Vichy to convey again the  
substance of the message to the Marshal if he gains  
the impression that the latter had not grasped its  
full import, and make it quite clear to him that the  
message came from myself? I do not want to press  
Marshal Petain to cross to North Africa; I would not  
press him for any further answer; I only want to be  
sure that there has been no misunderstanding and that  
the Marshal would be fully aware of the nature and origin  
of the message."

JOHNSON

NPL

RDS

GRAY

LONDON

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

Dated January 3, 1941

Rec'd 10:55 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

25, January 3, 10 p.m.

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

Department's 3977, December 31, 1 p.m.

FOLLOWING FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL  
PERSON.

"One. I have received your message of December 31st<sup>?</sup> on the subject of the supply of milk and vitamin concentrates for children in unoccupied France and we have been greatly impressed by your arguments in favor of this proposal. The anxiety which we have always felt about this project is that it would lead to similar demands on behalf of our German occupied allies. We are indeed sure to be hard pressed by these unhappy people and it is therefore important that we should maintain the distinction which you draw so clearly between German occupied territories and those not in actual occupation. I feel sure that I can count upon your help to maintain this distinction for otherwise the whole fabric of our blockade would be fatally undermined and I need not stress to you what  
this

-2- #25, January 3, 10 p.m., from London.

this would mean in terms of final victory.

Two. We are prepared to agree at once to the despatch of the first ship to Seville, Barcelona and Marseille as you propose subject to the following arrangements as regards safeguards which seem to us to meet the case.

(1) Relief goods to be confined to medical supplies in the strict sense (excluding cod and halibut liver oils) vitamin concentrates, dried or tinned milk and children's clothing.

(2) Distribution to be affected solely by the American Red Cross either direct from their own depots or under strict supervision to children's hospitals and clinics.

(3) Assurances to be secured from the Vichy Government that the press shall be allowed to publish periodical accounts of the relief work undertaken, such accounts to include reference to the cooperation of His Majesty's Government in allowing passage through the blockade.

(4) Further shipments to be stopped if there should be any evidence that these conditions are not being fulfilled.

Three. There is one point over which you can help us greatly. In any announcement of the scheme which is made in America we should like our part in the transaction to be presented in as favorable a light as possible. While it would be made clear that this step had been taken

on



-3- #25, January 3, 10 p.m., from London.

on your initiative, we would like it stated that the relief goods are available only by good will of His Majesty's Government. The impression which we should like to see created is that of Anglo-American cooperation for humanitarian ends."

JOHNSON

EMB

COPY

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL TELEGRAM

SERIAL No.

T 713

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

The view expressed in your note transmitted by Ambassador Winant in telegram of October 8 has been carefully considered. I fully agree that the Wheat Agreement should avoid any impression of forcing wheat importing countries of Europe, as a condition of immediate post war relief, into commitments which they had no part in formulating and see no objection to your instructing your delegation to emphasize this consideration in the discussions. I should like, however, to offer the following general comments with respect to our attitude on the subject of the wheat discussions.

We have not looked upon these discussions as a conference in any formal sense but rather as a meeting of competent experts in a position to reflect the views of their respective governments on one important problem in the general field of Anglo-American collaboration.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

We ...

We hope that it will be possible to find a large area of agreement on the part of the four overseas exporting countries and the United Kingdom as to the means of tackling the world wheat problem on an international basis. It is our feeling that marked progress was made in this direction in the discussions during last July and August.

So far as the forthcoming discussions are concerned, I may say that we hold no brief for the precise form or wording of the draft prepared during the meeting of last July. There are undoubtedly a number of points that will need to be revised in the light of the study that has been given to the question by the various governments since the discussions were adjourned last August. We attach special importance at this juncture to what seems to us to be two vital aspects of any effective international wheat agreement, namely, first, the equitable sharing of such post war market as may be available to  
the ...

the four overseas exporting countries, including the questions of distribution of wheat for relief after the war, the establishment of the principle of an international ever normal granary on a practical working basis, and, second, the co-operation of the United Kingdom as the world's greatest wheat importing country in constructing an international Wheat Agreement which will work to the mutual benefit of both importing and exporting countries.

I am entirely in agreement with you as to the importance of considering the interest of Russia in this matter but it seems to me it should be entirely feasible to arrive at a framework which will leave the way open for Russian adherence.

Copies sent to:-

Buckingham Palace.  
Sir E. Bridges.  
Foreign Office.  
Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
Minister without Portfolio.

Recd. 18.10.41.



COPY.

PRIME MINISTER'S  
PERSONAL TELEGRAM  
SERIAL NO. T.441.

FORMER NAVAL PERSON TO PRESIDENT.

PERSONAL AND [REDACTED]

I am most grateful for your message about the tank programme. This addition to our tank resources in the coming critical months is splendid. As to the longer term policy all our experience goes to show that more heavily armed and armoured vehicles are required for modern battle and we should therefore plan to increase the output of medium tanks at the expense of light tanks, but not of course at the expense of your air programme.

2. I am much interested in your suggestion that men for our Tank Corps should be trained in the United States. We are examining it here and will let you know our views as soon as possible.

3. We have been considering here our war plans, not only for the fighting of 1942 but also for 1943. After providing for the security of essential bases, it is necessary to plan on the largest scale the forces needed for victory. In broad outline, we must aim first at intensifying the blockade and propaganda. Then we must subject Germany and Italy to a ceaseless and ever growing air bombardment. These measures may themselves produce an internal convulsion or collapse. But plans ought also to be made for coming to the aid of the conquered populations by landing armies of liberation when opportunity is ripe. For this purpose it will be necessary not only to have great numbers of tanks, but also of vessels capable of carrying them and landing them direct on to beaches. It ought not to be difficult for you to make the necessary adaptation in some of the vast numbers of merchant vessels you are building so as to fit them for Tank-landing fast ships.

4. If you agree with this broad conception of bringing Germany to her knees, we should not lose a moment in:

- (a) Framing an agreed estimate as to our joint requirements of the primary weapons of war, e.g. aircraft, tanks, etc.
- (b) Thereafter considering how these requirements are to be met by our joint production.

5. Meanwhile I suggest that our combined staffs in London should set to work as soon as possible on (a) and that thereafter our technical experts should proceed with (b).

25.7.41.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

C O P Y.

PRIME MINISTER.

With reference to your Minute M.881/1 of the 8th September, I attach a Memorandum and a Print showing the alterations which would be required to American Merchant Ships to convert them to tank landing craft.

(Signed) DUDLEY POUND.

25th September 1941.



COPY.

MODIFICATION TO CERTAIN AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIPS  
FOR TANK LANDING.

The tanks and/or motor vehicles would be carried on the 2nd deck which would require to be lowered and possibly stiffened locally.

An opening approximately 40' long and 10'6" high would be cut in the shell plating amidships on each side for vehicles to pass through, either when being taken on board or when being disembarked. This opening would be fitted with a hinged flap door which when open would form a platform.

Two brows about 80' long by 13' wide, one each side, would be carried by the ship when tank operations are envisaged and would be stowed against the ship's side forward of the openings during passage to and from the scene of operations. The brows would be long enough to enable tanks to land on the beach if the vessels were aground or to land into T.L.Cs. should it be desired to keep the vessel afloat.

The biggest alteration is lowering the 2nd deck so that the height between this and the upper deck gives sufficient head room for the vehicles. A minimum headroom of 10'6" all fore and aft would be required, a passage-way at least 13' wide being provided on one side of the machinery casing. It is not possible to say with our present knowledge whether the existing machinery layout would permit the lowering of the 2nd deck in this area.

Openings 13' wide and 10'6" high would be necessary in the main transverse tween deck bulkheads to allow vehicles a clear passage fore and aft. These openings would have to be closed when the ship is used as a cargo carrier in order to provide the requisite transverse strength and watertight sub-division.

Although the openings in the side plating would be made watertight for the ship's ordinary service as a cargo carrier by means of the hinged steel door, these doors would not contribute to the longitudinal strength of the ship. The scantlings of the shell plating and bulwarks around the openings would be increased to compensate for the loss in strength due to the cutting of these large ports.

The above proposals would enable the ship to carry and land up to 40 ton tanks, probably 25 in number, and up to 3 ton army lorries; still heavier tanks could be dealt with by shoring the brow. The general scheme is illustrated on attached print.

It is assumed that these ships would be used after the first operation of landing and seizing the foreshore and country immediately surrounding, that is, the vessels would be Tank Landing Ships not Tank Assault Ships. A certain amount of accommodation would have to be provided for tank crews and maintenance staff and it would be necessary to devise some arrangement for ventilating the tank stowage space during the landing operation. The fitting of such accommodation and ventilation would involve taking the ships in hand a fair time before they could be used for tank carrying.

25th September, 1941.



10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

20. October 1941.

For yourself alone.

PART I.

*My dear Mr. President,*

1. Sometime this Fall, General Auchinleck will attack the German and Italian armies in Cyrenaica with his utmost available power. We believe his forces will be stronger than the enemy's in troops, in artillery, in aircraft, and particularly in tanks. His object will be to destroy the enemy's armed and, above all, armoured forces, and to capture Benghazi as quickly as possible.
2. Should this operation prosper, the plans which have been prepared for a further rapid advance upon Tripoli may be carried out. Should success attend this further effort, important reactions may be expected which it is provident to study in advance.
3. General Weygand may be stirred into joining in the war, or the Germans may make demands upon him or



Vichy for facilities in French North Africa which may force him into the war.

4. To profit by these contingencies, we are holding a force equivalent to one armoured and three field divisions ready with shipping from about the middle of November. This force could either enter Morocco by Casablanca upon French invitation, or otherwise help to exploit in the Mediterranean a victory in Libya.

5. In order to cover effectively these preparations, we have prepared large-scale plans for a descent upon the Norwegian coast, and also for a reinforcement of the Russians in Murmansk. There is substance as well as shadow in these plans.

6. It seems therefore probable that we shall have to send away from Great Britain four or even five divisions besides the 18th Division which will arrive at Halifax on November 7 on its journey round the Cape to Suez. We must expect that as soon as Hitler stabilizes the Russian front, he will begin to gather perhaps fifty or

sixty divisions in the west for the invasion of the British Isles. We have had reports, which may be exaggerated, of the building of perhaps 800 craft capable of carrying 8 or 10 tanks each across the North Sea, and of landing anywhere upon the beaches. Of course there will be Parachute and Airborne descents on a yet unmeasured scale. One may well suppose his programme to be:-  
1939 - Poland; 1940 - France; 1941 - Russia; 1942 - England; 1943 - ? At any rate, I feel that we must be prepared to meet a supreme onslaught from March onwards.

7. In moving four or five divisions, including one armoured division, out of the United Kingdom in these circumstances, we are evidently taking risks. Should events happily take the course assumed in the earlier paragraphs of this letter, and should we in fact reduce our forces at home to the extent mentioned, it would be a very great reassurance and a military advantage of the highest order if you were able to place a United States Army Corps and Armoured Division, with all the Air Force possible, in the

North of Ireland (of course at the invitation of that Government as well as of His Majesty's Government), thus enabling us to withdraw the three divisions we now have in Northern Ireland besides the troops in Iceland (now being relieved), for the defence of Great Britain.

8. We should feel very much freer to act with vigour in the manner I have outlined if we knew that such a step on your part was possible. Moreover, the arrival of American troops in Northern Ireland would exercise a powerful effect upon the whole of Eire, with favourable consequences that cannot be measured. It would also be a deterrent upon German invasion schemes. I hope this may find a favourable place in your thoughts. I do not suggest that any decision should be taken until we see the result of the approaching battle.



10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

Personal and [REDACTED]

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PART II.

9. A decisive success in the Mediterranean theatre would also, I hope, allay the doubts and anxieties of some of your Generals about the wisdom of our trying to hold the Middle East, and particularly the Nile Valley. The organization of the rearward services is steadily improving, but we welcome all helpful and constructive criticism. I had a long talk with General Brett, who lunched with me, and have carefully noted various suggestions which he made. He is of course a strong partisan for keeping the Air Force subordinate to the Army, and not having any independent strategic Air service. This may be sound so far as the United States is concerned, but over here we have needed to emphasize the dominance of the Air Arm in its independent aspect, and from this it follows that the parts of our Air Force associated with the Navy or the Army should only be subsidiary to the parent Service.



10. In the Middle East, as I told you in a recent telegram, I have ruled that whenever a major military operation is in hand, the Air Force should be effectively subordinated to General Auchinleck. In practice, no difficulty has arisen between him and the Air Commander except the difficulty, so often present in war, of finding out what is the right thing to do. At the last action on June 15 - 18, our Air was so anxious to serve the Army that it allowed itself to be parcelled out among the various columns, affording a number of local umbrellas and losing its decisive power to strike at the enemy's Air force. We hope to profit by our previous mistakes.

11. "Unity of Command" could not be extended to cover the Navy. The Admiral, who invariably leads the Fleet to sea, must be at Alexandria or within an hour or two of it. In combined operations, of which we have a long and variegated experience, we have never followed the practice of subordinating the Navy to the Army, or vice versa. The very best relations prevail between the Naval and Military Commanders-in-Chief, and I do not know of any

inconvenience that has arisen, except of course that when the Admiral is fighting at sea, his Deputy cannot speak with the same authority. This coming battle will be entrusted on land to General Cunningham, and on sea to his brother, Admiral Cunningham, and, by an odd coincidence, the Commander of all the Air forces which are to be engaged is also named Coningham. Let us hope that the firm of Cunningham, Cunningham and Coningham will flourish.

12. The idea of having One Man in complete command of everything is more attractive in theory than in practice. No sooner has all power been placed in one hand, than it has to be divided up again. I have described the arrangements of the Command on which we are working. In organization we draw the line between the Q. services of the Army (which are under the Military Commander-in-Chief), and those of the rear (which are under the Minister of State and his Officer, the Intendant-General) at the point where more than one Service is involved. This solution, which has been reached after other alternatives have been tried,

leaves the field workshops and factories in the Delta under the Army, but assigns all common services, ports, landing facilities, rearward communications and long-term projects to the sphere of the Minister of State.

13. All my information goes to show that a victory in Cyrenaica of the British over the Germans will alter the whole shape of the war in the Mediterranean. Spain may be heartened to fight for her neutrality. A profound effect may be produced upon the already-demoralized Italy. Perhaps most important of all, Turkey may be consolidated in her resistance to Hitler. We do not require Turkey to enter the war aggressively at the present moment, but only to maintain a stolid, unyielding front to German threats and blandishments. As long as Turkey is not violated or seduced, this great oblong pad of poorly-developed territory is an impassable protection for the Eastern flank of our Nile Army. If Turkey were forced to enter the war, we should of course have to give her a great deal of support which might be better used elsewhere, either in French North Africa or in the Caucasus. We are

making promises of support to Turkey (contingent on the military situation) which amount to between four and six divisions, and twenty or thirty Air Squadrons, and we are actively preparing with them the necessary airfields in Anatolia. But what Turkey requires to keep her sound is a British victory over Germans, making all promises real and living.

14. These dispositions as I have set them out, do not allow us in the next six months to make any serious contribution to the Russian defence of the Caucasus and Caspian Basin. The best help we can give the Russians is to relieve the five Russian Divisions now crowded into Northern Persia. If these are brought home and used in the battle, I have pledged the faith of Britain to Stalin that no rightful Russian interest shall suffer, and that we will take no advantages in Persia at their expense. I do not however see how, in the period mentioned, we can put more than a symbolic force into the Caucasus, and the Russians retain a similar representation in Persia. The Russians much disturb Persia by their presence, their



theories and their behaviour, and the outbreak of disorders would mean that we should have to spread three or four British-Indian divisions to keep open the communications from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian. These communications, which are a vital part of our joint Aid to Russia policy, would thus be largely choked by the need of supplying the extra forces. I have been trying to get the Russians to see this point.

15. In my telegram of July 25, 1941, which I sent you before our Atlantic meeting, I spoke of the long-term project for 1943 of the simultaneous landing of say 15,000 tanks from hundreds of specially-fitted ocean-going ships on the beaches of three or four countries ripe for revolt. I suggested that the necessary alterations could easily be made at this stage to a proportion of your merchant ships now building on so vast a scale. I now send you the drawings prepared by the Admiralty, which illustrate the kind of treatment the vessels would require. You will see that it is estimated only to add about £50,000 to their cost, and I suppose a proportionate delay. It seems to

me that not less than 200 ships should be thus fitted. There is sufficient time, as we cannot think of such a plan before 1943. But the essential counterpart of the Tank programme you have now embarked upon, is the power to transport them across the oceans and land them upon unfortified beaches along the immense coast-line Hitler is committed to defend. I trust therefore, Mr. President, that this will commend itself to you.

16. I send you a short note which I have made upon the use of artillery, both Field and Flak. This has its bearing upon the approaching offensive in Part I, as well as upon the organization of our Home Army to meet invasion. All the authorities are agreed upon the principles set forth, and you are very welcome to show this paper, should you think it worth while, to your Officers.

17. I also send, for your own personal information, a note I have made on the structure, present and future, of the British and Imperial Armies which we are endeavouring to organize in 1942. Of course the figure of about 100 divisions does not, as is fully explained, mean

100 mobile standard Field Divisions. Some are Garrison; some are Anti-Aircraft; and some are equivalents in Brigade groups. Broadly speaking, however, it represents a much more considerable deployment of military strength than we had planned at the outbreak of the war. This has been rendered possible by the fact that we have not been engaged to any serious extent since the losses of Dunkirk, and that munitions and reserves have accumulated instead of being expended on a great scale.

18. I have not referred to the Japanese menace, which has seemed to grow so much sharper in the last few days, nor to the splendid help you are giving us in the Atlantic, because we discussed these great matters so fully at our meeting, and events are now telling their own tale in accordance with our anticipations. I still think, however, that the stronger the action of the United States towards Japan, the greater the chance of preserving peace. Should however peace be broken and the United States become at war with Japan, you may be sure that a British declaration of war upon Japan will follow within

the hour. We hope to be able before Christmas to provide a considerable Battle-squadron for the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

19. Lastly, Mr. President, let me tell you how I envy the Lord Privy Seal in being able to fly over to the United States and have a good talk with you. My place is here, and therefore I have taken this opportunity of writing you so long a letter. Might I ask that all reference to the forthcoming operations shall be kept absolutely secret, and for yourself alone? For this purpose I have separated the first part of the letter from the rest in the hopes that after reading it you will speedily consign it to the flames.

*With kindest regards & every  
good wish. Believe me Mr. President*

*Your sincere friend,*

*Christie. Churchill*

His Excellency

The President of the United States.





10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

**SECRET**

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BRIGADIER HOLLIS.  
C.O.S. COMMITTEE.

Part I . The Atlantic Front

1. The procedure outlined in your Minute to me of yesterday is most desirable. There should be two or three meetings on successive days of the three or four principal persons on each side, presided over by the President. At these meetings the whole scope of the war can be discussed, and particular points as they arise can be referred to sub-Committees for implementing in detail. It is, however, necessary that while we are on board here we should make up our minds on the policy we wish to pursue and the chief proposals we should make to the United States' representatives. I do not attempt to deal with the question of allocation of supplies in these notes, but only with the war policy of 1942 and 1943.

2. Hitler's failure and losses in Russia are the <sup>prime</sup> ~~greatest~~ fact in the war at this time. We cannot tell how great the disaster to the German Army and Nazi regime will be. This regime has hitherto lived upon easily and cheaply won successes. Instead of what was imagined to be a swift and easy victory, it has now to face the shock of a Winter of slaughter and expenditure of fuel and equipment on the largest scale.

Neither Great Britain nor the United States have any part to play in this event except to make sure that we send, without fail and punctually, the supplies we have promised. In this way alone shall we hold our influence over Stalin and be able to weave the mighty Russian effort into the general texture of the war.

3. In a lesser degree the impending victory of General Auchinleck in Cyrenaica is an injury to the German Powers. We may expect the total destruction of the enemy force in Libya to be apparent before the end of the year. This not only inflicts a heavy blow upon the Germans and Italians, but it frees our forces in

the Nile Valley from the major threat of invasion from the west under which they have long dwelt. Naturally, General Auchinleck will press on as fast as possible with the operation called "ACROBAT", which should give him possession of Tripoli and if so bring his armoured vanguard to the French frontier of Tunis. He may be able to supply a forecast before we separate at Washington.

4. The German losses and defeat in Russia and their extirpation from Libya may, of course, impel them to a supreme effort in the Spring to break the ring that is closing on them by a south-eastward thrust either through the Caucasus or <sup>enough</sup> to Anatolia, or both. However, we should not assume that necessarily they will have the war energy for this task. The Russian armies recuperating<sup>ed</sup> by the Winter will lie heavy upon them from Leningrad to the Crimea. They may easily be forced to evacuate the Crimea. There is no reason at this time to suppose that the Russian Navy will not command the Black Sea. Nor should it be assumed that the present life-strength of Germany is such as to make an attack upon Turkey and <sup>2</sup> march through Anatolia a business to be undertaken in

present circumstances by the Nazi regime. The Turks have 50 Divisions; their fighting quality and the physical obstacles of their country are well-known. Although Turkey has played for safety throughout, the Russian command of the Black Sea and the British successes in the Levant and along the North Africa shore, together with the proved weakness of the Italian Fleet, would justify every effort on our part to bring Turkey into line, and are certainly sufficient to encourage her to resist a German inroad. While it would be imprudent to regard the danger of a German south-west thrust against the Persian, Iraq, Syrian front as removed, it certainly now seems much less likely <sup>as imminent</sup> than heretofore.

5. We ought, therefore, to try hard to win over French North Africa and now is the moment to use every inducement and form of pressure at our disposal upon the Government of Vichy and the French authorities in North Africa. The German set-back in Russia, the British successes in Libya, the moral



and military collapse of Italy; above all, the Declarations of War exchanged between Germany and the United States, must strongly affect the mind of France and the French Empire. Now is the time to offer to Vichy and to French North Africa a blessing or cursing. A blessing will consist in a promise by the United States and Great Britain to re-establish France as a Great Power with her territories undiminished (except for the changes in Syria and certain adjustments which may be necessary on the frontier of Spanish Morocco.) It should carry with it an offer of active aid by British and <sup>United States</sup> ~~French~~ Expeditionary Forces, both from the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco and at convenient landing points in Algeria and Tunis as well as from General Auchinleck's forces advancing from the East. Ample supplies <sup>for</sup> ~~from~~ the French and the Loyal Moors should be made available. Vichy should be asked to send their fleet from Toulon to Oran and Bizerta, and to bring France into the war again as a principal.

This would mean that the Germans would take over the whole of France and rule it as occupied territory.

It does not seem that the conditions in the occupied and the hitherto unoccupied zones are widely different. Whatever happens European France will inevitably be subjected to a complete blockade. There is, of course, always the chance that the Germans, tied up in Russia, may not care to take over unoccupied France even though French North Africa is at war with them.

6. If we can obtain even the connivance of Vichy to French North Africa coming over to our side we must be ready to send considerable forces as soon as possible. Apart from anything which General Auchinleck can bring in from the East, should he be successful in Tripolitania, we hold ready in Britain (Operation "GYMNAST") about 55,000 men comprising two Divisions and an armoured unit, together with the shipping. These forces could enter French North Africa by invitation on the twenty-third day after the order to embark them was given. Leading elements and air forces from Malta could reach Bizerta at very short notice. It is desired that the United States should at the same time promise to bring in, via

Casablanca and other African Atlantic ports, not less than 150,000 men during the next six months. It is essential that some American elements, say 25,000 men, should go at the earliest moment after French agreement, either Vichy or North African, had been obtained.

7. It is also asked that the United States will send the equivalent of three Divisions and one Armoured Division into Northern Ireland. These Divisions could, if necessary, complete their training in Northern Ireland. The presence of American forces there would become known to the enemy, and they could be led to magnify their actual numbers. The presence of United States' troops in the British Isles would be a powerful additional deterrent against an attempt at invasion by Germany. It would enable us to nourish the campaign in French North Africa by two more Divisions and one complete Armoured Division. If forces of this order could be added to the French Army already in North Africa with proper air support, the Germans would have to make a very difficult and costly campaign across uncommanded waters to subdue North Africa. The

North-west African theatre is one most favourable for Anglo-American operations, our approaches being direct and convenient across the Atlantic, while the enemy's passage of the Mediterranean would be severely obstructed as is happening in their Libyan enterprise.

8. It may be mentioned here that we greatly desire American Bomber Squadrons to come into action from the British Isles against Germany. Our own bomber programme has fallen short of our hopes. It is formidable and is increasing, but its full development has been delayed. It must be remembered that we place great hopes of affecting German production and German morale by ever more severe and more accurate bombing of their cities and harbours and that this, combined with their Russian defeats, may produce important effects upon the will-to-fight <sup>of</sup> of the German people, and with consequential internal reactions upon the German Government. The arrival in the United Kingdom of, say, 20 American Bomber Squadrons, <sup>or a token force of 6 for a show</sup> would emphasise and accelerate this process, and would be the most direct and effective reply to the Declaration of War



by Germany upon the United States. Arrangements will be made in Great Britain to increase this process and develop the Anglo-American bombing of Germany without any top limit from now on till the end of the war.

9. We must, however, reckon with a refusal by Vichy to act as we desire, and on the contrary they may rouse French North Africa to active resistance. They may help German troops to enter North Africa; the Germans may force their way or be granted passage through Spain; the French Fleet at Toulon may pass under German control, and France and the French Empire may be made by Vichy to collaborate actively with Germany against us, although it is not likely that this would go through effectively. The overwhelming majority of the French are ranged with Great Britain and now still more with the United States. It is by no means certain that Admiral Darlan can deliver the Toulon Fleet over intact to Germany. It is most improbable that French soldiers and sailors would fight effectively against the United States and Great Britain. Nevertheless, we must not exclude the

possibility of a half-hearted association of the defeatist elements in France and North Africa with Germany. In this case our task in North Africa will become much harder.

A Campaign must be fought in 1942 to gain possession of, or conquer, the whole of the North African shore, including the Atlantic ports of Morocco. Dakar and other French West African Ports must be captured before the end of the year. Whereas, however, entry into French North Africa is urgent to prevent German penetration, a period of 8 or 9 months' preparation may well be afforded for the mastering of Dakar and the West African establishments. Plans should be set on foot forthwith. If sufficient time and preparation are allowed and the proper apparatus provided, these latter operations present no insuperable difficulty.

10. Our relationship with General de Gaulle and the Free French Movement will require to be reviewed. Hitherto the United States have entered into no undertakings similar to those comprised in my correspondence with him. Through no particular fault

of his own he has not been of any important help to us. Indeed, his Movement has created new antagonisms in French minds. Any action which the United States may now feel able to take in regard to him should have the effect inter alia of re-defining our obligations to him and France so as to make those obligations more closely dependent upon the <sup>effective</sup> ~~eventual~~ effort by him and the French nation to rehabilitate themselves. If Vichy were to <sup>the United States</sup> act as we desire about French North Africa, Great Britain must labour to bring about a reconciliation between the Free French (de Gaullists) and those <sup>other</sup> Frenchmen who will have taken up arms once more against Germany. If, on the other hand, Vichy assists in collaboration with Germany and we have to fight our way into French North and West Africa, then the de Gaullists' Movement will be of value and must be aided and used to the full.

11. We cannot tell what will happen in Spain. It seems probable that the Spaniards will not give the Germans a free passage through Spain to attack Gibraltar and invade North Africa. There may be infiltration, but the formal demand for the passage of

an Army would be resisted. If so, the Winter would be the worst time for the Germans to attempt to force their way through Spain. Moreover, Hitler with nearly all Europe to hold down by armed force in the face of defeat and semi-starvation, may well be chary of taking over unoccupied France and involving himself in bitter guerilla warfare with the morose, fierce, hungry people of the Iberian Peninsula. Everything possible must be done by Britain and the United States to strengthen their will to resist. The present policy of limited supplies should be pursued. Hope should be held out of an improvement of the Spanish/Moroccan frontier at the expense of France, who must be made to understand that her rehabilitation following an Anglo-American victory will be an overwhelming reward which she has yet to deserve.

The value of Gibraltar Harbour and base to us is so great that no attempts should be made upon the Atlantic Islands until either the Peninsula is invaded or the Spaniards give passage to the Germans.



12. To sum up, the war in the West in 1942 comprises, as its main offensive effort, the occupation and control by Great Britain and the United States of the whole of the North and West African Possessions of France, and the further control by Britain of the whole North African shore from Tunis to Egypt, thus giving, if the Naval situation allows, free passage through the Mediterranean to the Levant and the Suez Canal. These great objectives can only be achieved if British and American naval and air superiority in the Atlantic is maintained, if supply lines continue uninterrupted, and if the British Isles are effectively safeguarded against invasion.

16.12.41



10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

1942

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PART II - THE PACIFIC FRONT.

1. The heavy losses inflicted by Japan upon the United States and British Forces in the Pacific theatre have given the Japanese, for the time being, superiority in these vast waters. There are at present few points in the East Indies to which they cannot transport a superior land force. By insulting the western seaboard of Canada and the United States, or the shores of Australia, with attacks of individual cruisers or seaborne aircraft they may seek to cause alarm and the dispersion of our forces. However, on account of the great number of objectives open to them - far more than they can possibly devour simultaneously - they must be expected, if they act wisely, to concentrate upon securing their military position in the East Indies. On this principle they would do their

utmost to capture Manila while making their longer advance overland towards Singapore. At the same time they would strike at Burma and the Burma Road, thus isolating China. No relief is possible for Hong Kong. The Japanese must be expected to establish themselves on both sides of the Straits of Malacca and in the Straits of Sunda, to take a number of islands in the Malaysian Archipelago, and to endeavour to occupy various parts of the Dutch East Indies.

The above <sup>if stubbornly resisted,</sup> will involve the employment of very large numbers of Japanese troops, and their supply and maintenance will strain Japanese sea transport.

We should ask the United States' authorities what is their view about a Japanese attempt to take and occupy Hawaii by an expedition. With the knowledge at present available to us it seems it would be an ill-judged and therefore unlikely enterprise.

2. We do not know what estimate of time the United States authorities place upon the resistance of Manila and other key points in the Philippines. We expect, however, that Singapore island and fortress will stand an attack for at least six months, although meanwhile the naval base

will not be useable by either side. A large Japanese army with <sup>its</sup> ~~besiege~~ train and ample supplies of ammunition and engineering stores will be required for their attack upon Singapore. Considerable Japanese forces also will be needed for the attack on Burma and the Burma Road. The line of communications between the Malay Archipelago and Japan is nearly 2,000 miles in length and dangerously vulnerable. The Japanese armies landed in the Malay Peninsula, or in Indo-China, Siam and Burma, <sup>will soon</sup> constitute immense commitments which would be immediately imperilled by <sup>the</sup> recovery by the United States of major sea-control in the Pacific. This process should be aided by Great Britain. In the meanwhile <sup>as</sup> ~~the~~ attack upon Japanese sea communications by United States and Dutch <sup>Submarines</sup> ~~boats~~ and other vessels constitutes a grievous danger to the enemy.

3. How then is this <sup>superiority</sup> ~~superiority~~ of Anglo-American sea-power to be <sup>regained</sup> ~~reckoned~~? The two new 45,000 ton Japanese battleships are dominating factors, and it is not seen how a superior line of battle can be drawn out against Japan in the Pacific theatre for sometime. It may well be that this will not be achieved until the two new American



16" gun battleships join the Pacific Fleet. The date of May has been mentioned, but it is not known to us whether this is the date of commissioning of these ships or of their being fully worked up. It would seem unjustifiably hazardous to fight a general fleet action until these two ships at least have joined the United States' Pacific Fleet. Diversions and enterprises by United States aircraft carriers escorted by fast cruisers against the exposed cities of Japan constitute a form of interim offensive action which will presumably be earnestly studied.

4. The British naval contribution to the war against Japan has been crippled by the sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE. We have to base on Scapa Flow the five Capital ships, viz: KING GEORGE V; DUKE OF YORK; RODNEY; NELSON (ready at the end of <sup>March</sup> February) and RENOWN, together with one modern aircraft carrier "VICTORIOUS". We contemplate basing on Gibraltar (while it is available) the "MALAYA" and a second modern aircraft carrier, probably "FORMIDABLE". These forces should be sufficient to assure the ultimate control of the Atlantic in the event of a

sortie by the "TIRPITZ" (probably the most powerful vessel afloat) supported by "SCHEER" and <sup>also</sup> by the "SCHARNHORST", "GNEISENAU" and "PRINZ EUGEN" if at any time they can be repaired at Brest. We hope by frequent air bombing to keep these last three ships out of action. We therefore concur with the United States' Naval Authorities in their transference of all American Capital ships from the Atlantic to Hawaii or elsewhere in the Pacific. We ask, however, that as many <sup>US</sup> destroyers as possible shall be left to guard the vital supply line between America and the British Isles.

5. In the meanwhile we propose to organize in the Indian Ocean a force of three armoured carriers, viz: INDOMITABLE, ILLUSTRIOUS and HERMES, together with suitable cruiser escort. At a later stage FURIOUS will be available. This force, based on Trincomalee and ranging as far as Port Darwin, should be formed and in action from the end of February. The four "R" Class battleships, RAMILLIES, REVENGE, ROYAL SOVEREIGN and RESOLUTION will be available as they arrive upon the scene for <sup>or other</sup> convoy duties between the Cape, Australia and Egypt. It is thought by the

Admiralty that the three aircraft carriers working in combination may exercise a very powerful deterrent effect upon the movement of Japanese heavy ships into the Indian Ocean or in the waters between Australia and South Africa, and may to some extent repair the loss of battleship strength. We presume the United States will make their numerous and powerful aircraft carriers play a similar part in the northern Pacific. We are ready to concert action with the United States' fleet, and we should welcome the study of the combined use of all important units in the Pacific for any major offensive operation which may be deemed practicable. It would be only in the last resort that we should withdraw the "QUEEN ELIZABETH" and "VALIANT" from the Mediterranean. If adequate air forces were available on the Egyptian and Libyan shores this would not necessarily expose North East Africa to German overseas invasion. The withdrawal of these two battleships from the Eastern Mediterranean would, however, make the victualling of Malta far more difficult, and would exercise a disastrous effect upon Turkey, whose confidence it is so important to maintain. Only if Australia were

to be threatened with imminent invasion on a large scale could we contemplate such a step. We therefore propose that "WARSPITE", when repaired in February, should join Admiral Cunningham's fleet at Alexandria. It may, however, be observed that in supreme emergency, or for a great occasion, these three fast modernized ships united to the three aircraft carriers aforesaid, and with the "R" Class battleships, constitute a respectable force.

6. This is the best we can do until the completion and working-up of the "ANSON" and the "HOWE". The original dates for these were May and September 1942, plus two months working-up in each case. Since the Japanese Declaration of War extreme priority has been given to these vessels and 24-hour shifts are being worked upon them. It is hoped that the "HOWE" may be advanced from September, perhaps to July. Unless some serious losses have been suffered in the interval, as is always possible, or unless the two Italian "Littorio" battleships have been taken over effectively and manned by the Germans, these two ships, <sup>or alternatively the 16" gun Rodney & Nelson</sup> might be considered available to reinforce the Allied fleets in the Pacific either themselves or by



setting free their two consorts. If they were added to the two new United States 16"-gun battleships they should give a good margin of superiority even if in the judgment of the United States Naval Authorities that has not been achieved earlier. We may therefore look to the Autumn of 1942 as the period when we shall have recovered superior naval control of the Pacific. From that moment <sup>all</sup> the Japanese overseas expeditions will be in jeopardy, and offensive operations on the largest scale may be set on foot either against their country, their Possessions or their new conquests<sup>to</sup>. These again should be the subject of immediate planning.

The questions which remain open are how much injury we shall have to suffer in the interval; how strongly the Japanese will fortify themselves in their new positions, and whether the Philippines and Singapore can hold out so long. It is of first importance for us to <sup>a</sup>bridge this waiting period by every conceivable means.

17.12.41



**SECRET**

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

PART III - 1943

If the operations outlined in Parts I and II should prosper during 1942 the situation at the beginning of 1943 might be as follows:-

- (a) United States and Great Britain would have recovered effective naval superiority in the Pacific, and all Japanese overseas commitments would be endangered both from the assailing of their communications and from British and American expeditions sent to recover places lost;
- (b) The British Isles would remain intact and more strongly prepared against invasion than ever before;
- (c) The whole West and North African shores from Dakar to the Suez Canal, and the

Levant to the Turkish frontier, would be in Anglo-American hands.

Turkey, though not necessarily at war, would be definitely incorporated in the American-British-Russian front. The Russian position would be strongly established and the supplies of British and American material as promised would have in part compensated for the loss of Russian munition-making capacity. It might be that a footing would already have been established in Sicily and Italy, with reactions inside Italy which might be highly favourable.

2. But all this would fall short of bringing the war to an end. The war cannot be ended by driving Japan back to her own bounds and defeating her overseas forces. The war can only be ended through the defeat in Europe of the German Armies, or through internal convulsions in Germany produced by the unfavourable course of the war, economic privations and the Allied bombing offensive. As the strength of the United States, Great Britain and Russia develops and begins to be realised by the Germans, an internal collapse is always possible, but we must not count upon this. Our plans must proceed upon the

assumption that the resistance of the German Army and Air Force will continue at its present level and that their U-boat warfare will be conducted by increasingly numerous flotillas.

3. We have, therefore, to prepare for the liberation of the captive countries of Western and Southern Europe by the landing at suitable points, successively or simultaneously, of British and American armies strong enough to enable the conquered populations to revolt. By themselves they will never be able to revolt owing to the ruthless counter-measures that will be employed: but if adequate and suitably equipped forces were landed in several of the following countries, namely, Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, the French Channel coasts and the French Atlantic coasts, as well as Italy and possibly the Balkans, the German garrisons would prove insufficient to cope <sup>with</sup> ~~at once~~ with the strength of the liberating forces and the fury of the revolting peoples. It is impossible for the Germans while we retain the sea-power necessary to choose the place or



places of attack, to have sufficient troops in each of these countries for effective resistance. In particular, they cannot move their armour about laterally from North to South or West to East: either they must divide it between the various conquered countries - in which case it will become hopelessly dispersed - or they must hold it back in a central position in Germany, in which case it will not arrive until large and important lodgments have been made by us from overseas.

4. We must face here the usual clash between short-term and long-term projects. War is a constant struggle and must be waged from day to day. It is only with some difficulty and within limits that provision can be made for the future. Experience shows that forecasts are usually falsified and preparations always in arrears. Nevertheless, there must be a design and theme for bringing the war to a victorious end in a reasonable period. All the more is this necessary when under modern conditions no large-scale offensive operation can be lodged without the preparation of elaborate technical apparatus.

5. We should therefore face now the problems not only of driving Japan back to her homelands and regaining undisputed mastery in the Pacific, but also of liberating conquered Europe by the landing during the Summer of 1943 of United States and British armies on their shores. Plans should be prepared for the landing in all of the countries mentioned above. The actual choice of which three or four to pick should be deferred as long as possible so as to profit by the turn of events and make sure of secrecy.

6. In principle, the landings should be made by armoured and mechanized forces capable of disembarking not at ports but on beaches, either by landing-craft or from ocean-going ships specially adapted. The potential front of attack is thus made so wide that the German forces holding down these different countries cannot be strong enough at all points. An amphibious outfit must be prepared to enable these large-scale disembarkations to be made swiftly and surely. The vanguards of the various British and American exped-

itions should be marshalled by the Spring of 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles and, if possible, in French Morocco and Egypt. The main body would come direct across the ocean.

7. It need not be assumed that great numbers of men are required. If the <sup>incubation</sup> eruption of the armoured formations is successful, the uprising of the local population for whom weapons must be brought will supply the <sup>corpus</sup> cause of the liberating offensive. Forty Armoured Divisions, or their equivalent in tank Brigades, at 15,000 men apiece, of which Great Britain would try to produce nearly half, would amount to 600,000 men behind this armour. Another million men of all arms would suffice to wrest enormous territories from Hitler's domination; but these campaigns once started will require nourishing on a lavish scale. Our industries and trading establishments should, by the end of 1942, be running on a sufficient scale.

8. Apart from the command of the sea, without which nothing is possible, the essential to all these

operations is superior air power, and for landing purposes a large development of carrier-borne aircraft will be necessary. This, however, is needed anyhow for the war in 1942. In order to wear down the enemy and hamper his counter preparations, the bombing offensive of Germany from England and of Italy from Malta and, if possible, from Tripoli and Tunis, must reach the highest possible scale of intensity. Considering that the British first-line air strength is already slightly superior to that of Germany; that the Russian Air Force has already established a superiority on a large part of the Russian front and may be considered to be three-fifths the first-line strength of Germany, and that the United States' resources and future developments are additional, there is no reason why a decisive mastery of the air should not be established even before the Summer of 1943, and meanwhile heavy and continuous punishment inflicted upon Germany. Having regard to the fact that the bombing offensive is necessarily a matter of degree and that the targets cannot be moved away, it would be



right to assign priority to the fighter and torpedo-carrying aircraft required for the numerous carriers and improvised carriers which are available or must be brought into existence.

9. If we set these tasks before us now, being careful that they do not trench too much upon current necessities, we might hope, even if no German collapse occurs beforehand, to win the war at the end of 1943 or 1944. There might be advantage in declaring now our intention of sending armies of liberation into Europe in 1943. This would give hope to the subjugated peoples and prevent any truck between them and the German invaders. The setting and keeping in movement along our courses of the minds of so many scores of millions of men is in itself a potent atmospheric influence.

18.12.41



TOP SECRET

IV

10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

NOTES ON THE PACIFIC.

1. The Japanese have Naval superiority which enables them to transport troops to almost any desired point, possess themselves of it and establish it for an *air* naval fuelling base. The Allies will not have for some time the power to fight a general fleet engagement. Their power of convoying troops depends upon the size of the seas, which reduces the chance of interception. We can arrive by surprise from out of the wide seas at some place which we hold. Even without superior sea-power we may descend by surprise here and there. But we could not carry on a sustained operation across the seas. We must expect, therefore, to be deprived one by one of our Possessions and strong-points in the Pacific, and that the enemy will establish himself fairly easily in one after the other, mopping up the local garrisons.

2. In this interim period our duty is one of

stubborn resistance at each point attacked, and to slip supplies and reinforcements through as opportunity offers, taking all necessary risks. If our forces resist stubbornly and we reinforce them as much as possible, the enemy will be forced to make ever larger overseas commitments far from home: his shipping resources will be strained and his communications will provide vulnerable targets upon which all available naval and air forces, United States, British and Dutch - especially submarines - should concentrate their effort. It is of the utmost importance that the enemy should not acquire large gains cheaply; that he should be compelled to nourish all his conquests and kept extended, and kept burning up his resources.

3. The resources of Japan are a wasting factor. The country has been long overstrained by its wasteful war in China. They were at their maximum strength on the day of the Pearl Harbour attack. If it is true, as Stalin asserts, that they have, in addition to their own Air Force, 1,500 German airplanes (and he would have opportunities of knowing how they got there), they have now no means of

replacing wastage other~~than~~ by their small home production of ~~200/500~~ per month. Our policy should be to make them maintain the largest possible number of troops in their conquests overseas and to keep them as busy as possible so as to enforce well-filled lines of communications and a high <sup>rate</sup> ~~waste~~ of aircraft consumption. If we idle and leave them at ease they will be able to extend their conquests cheaply and easily; work with a minimum of overseas forces; make the largest gains and the smallest commitments and thus inflict upon us an enormous amount of damage. It is therefore right and necessary to fight them at every point where we have a fair chance so as to keep them burning and extended.

4. But we must steadily aim at regaining superiority at sea at the earliest moment. This can be gained in two ways: first, by the strengthening of our Capital ships. The two new Japanese battleships built free from Treaty limitations must be considered a formidable factor, influencing the whole Pacific theatre. It is understood that two new American battleships will be fit for action by May. Of course, all undertakings in war must be subject



to the action of the enemy, accidents and misfortune, but if our battleship strength should not be further reduced, nor any new unforeseen stress arise, we should hope to place the "NELSON" and the "RODNEY" at the side of these two new American battleships, making four 16"-gun modern vessels of major strength. Behind such a squadron the older reconstructed battleships of the United States should be available in numbers sufficient to enable a fleet action, under favourable circumstances, to be contemplated at any time after the month of May. The recovery of our Naval superiority in the Pacific, even if not brought to a trial of strength, would reassure the whole western seaboard of the American Continent and thus prevent a needless dissipation on a gigantic defensive effort of forces which have offensive parts to play. We must therefore set before ourselves, as a main strategic object, the forming of a definitely superior battle-fleet in the Pacific and we must aim at May as the date when this will be achieved.

5. Not only then, but in the interval, the warfare of sea-plane carriers should be developed to the greatest possible extent. We are ourselves forming a squadron of

three aircraft carriers, suitably attended, to act in the waters between South Africa, India and Australia. The United States have already seven regular carriers compared to Japan's ten, but those of the United States are larger. To this force of regular warship aircraft carriers we must add a very large development of improvised carriers, both large and small. In this way alone can we increase our seapower rapidly. Even if the carriers can only fly a dozen machines they may play their part in combination with other carriers. We ought to develop a floating air establishment sufficient to enable us to acquire and maintain for considerable periods and local air superiority over shore-based aircraft, sufficient to cover the landing of troops in order to attack the enemy's new conquests. Unless or until this local air superiority is definitely acquired even a somewhat superior fleet on our side would fight at a serious disadvantage. We cannot get more battleships than those now in sight for the year 1942, but we can and must get more aircraft carriers. It takes five years to build a

battleship, but it is possible to improvise a carrier in six months. Here then is a field for invention and ingenuity similar to that which called forth the extraordinary ~~feats~~<sup>fleets</sup> ~~of~~ flotillas which fought on the Mississippi in the Civil War. It must be accepted that the priority given to sea-borne aircraft of a suitable type will involve a retardation in the full-scale bombing offensive against Germany which we have contemplated as a major method of waging war. This, however, is a matter of time and of degree. We cannot in 1942 hope to reach the levels of bomb discharge in Germany which we had prescribed for that year, but we shall surpass them in 1943. Our joint programme may be late, but it will all come along. And meanwhile, the German cities and other targets will not disappear. While every effort must be made to speed up the rate of bomb discharge upon Germany until the great scales prescribed for 1943 and 1944 are reached, nevertheless we may be forced by other needs to face a retardation in our schedules. The more important will it be therefore that in this

interval a force, be it only symbolic, of United States' bombing squadrons should operate from the British Isles against the German cities and seaports.

6. Once the Allies have regained battle-fleet superiority in the Pacific and have created a seaborne air-power sufficient to secure local supremacy for certain periods, it will be possible either to attack the Japanese in their overseas conquests by military expeditions or to attack them in their homeland. It may well be the latter will be found the better. We must imagine the Japanese Air Force as being steadily and rapidly reduced and having no adequate power of replenishment. The approach to the shores of Japan near enough for our sea-borne air power to ravage their cities should be freed from its present prohibitive cost and danger. Nothing will more rapidly relieve the Japanese attacks in the East Indian theatre. Under the protection of the superior battle-fleet and the sea-borne air power aforesaid, it should be possible to acquire or regain various island bases enabling a definite approach



to be made to the homeland of Japan. The burning of Japanese cities by incendiary bombs will bring home in a most effective way to the people of Japan the dangers of the course to which they have committed themselves, and nothing is more likely to <sup>only</sup> crack the reinforcing of their overseas adventures.

7. The establishment of air bases in China or Russia from which attacks can be made upon the Japanese cities is in everyone's mind. It is most desirable that Russia should enter the war against Japan, thus enabling her own and Allied aircraft to bomb all the main cities in Japan from a convenient distance. This ~~will~~<sup>would</sup> also make available a force of about seventy Russian submarines to harass the Japanese lines of communications with their overseas commitments, especially at the point of departure from Japan. However, this is not a point upon which we can press the Russians unduly at the present time. They have withstood and are withstanding the giant assault of the German Army. They have achieved undreamed of success. If their resistance to the German Armies were to break

down, or even if their pressure upon them were to be relaxed, all the problems of the Caucasus, Syria, Palestine and Persia would resume the menacing shape they have only lately lost, entailing immense diversions of force upon Great Britain, and offering no satisfactory ~~assurance~~ security of success. The influence of the German losses and defeats against Russia upon the German people must be very depressing, and if this is prolonged it may provoke stresses within the German regime of the utmost hopeful consequence. M. Stalin has indicated that perhaps in the Spring he may be able to act against Japan. If he does not ~~feel~~ <sup>feel</sup> able ~~or~~ willing to do so now, it would be a mistake to press him unduly. Russia has more than rowed her weight in the boat, and she alone must judge when to take on more burden. The question of whether air bases in Russia could be acquired without entailing war between Japan and Russia is worth-while studying. It would certainly not be in Japan's interest any more than that of Russia to open up this new front of war. It might mean that an attitude of non-belligerency might be adopted by Russia

at a period before she would be willing to come into the war. Such an attitude of non-belligerency might permit aircraft, based on China, to re-fuel in Siberia before and after bombing Japan.

8. The danger of the Japanese using their numerous cruisers to raid all shipping between Australia and the Middle East, and even to assail our convoys round the Cape, will require to be met by the provision of battle-ship escort. We propose to use the four "R" Class battleships for this purpose if we need<sup>to</sup>. It is to be hoped that United States will also be ready to help in convoying work against cruiser attacks in the Pacific.

9. Lastly, there is the question of whether we should ask the United States to base her battle-fleet on Singapore, or perhaps make such a movement conditional on our adding our two battleships from the Atlantic. I am very doubtful about this. When we see what happened to the "PRINCE OF WALES" and the "REPULSE" in these narrow waters, soon to be infested with aircraft based ~~at~~ <sup>after</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>in the</sup> ~~vicinity of~~ <sup>the</sup> we cannot feel that they would be an inviting prospect to the United States. It would be represented as a

purely British conception. One is not sure of the work they could do when they got there, and whether they would not suffer unduly heavy losses. It would redouble the anxieties and waste of force upon the defences of the Pacific seaboard of America. It would put out of the way all chances of a seaborne offensive against the homelands of Japan. It is inconceivable that the United States' authorities would agree to it at any time which can at present be foreseen.

10. We cannot tell what will happen in the Philippines, and whether or for how long United States troops will be able to defend themselves. The defence of recapture of the Philippines cannot be judged upon theoretical principles. Wars of the present scale are largely wars of attrition and a wise choice of a particular battlefield is not necessarily the only criterion. The Philippines will undoubtedly appear to the United States as an American battle-ground which they are in honour bound to fight for. The Japanese will have to expend war-power and aircraft in this conflict, and even if it does not proceed in the best chosen theatre the process of exhaustion and wearing down of the



weaker country by the stronger is of very great advantage and relief to us in the Pacific sphere.

11. For these reasons it would not be wise to press the Americans to move their main fleet to Singapore.

12. Nor need we fear that this war in the Pacific will, after the first shock is over, absorb an unduly large proportion of United States' forces. The numbers of troops that we should wish them to use in Europe in 1942 will not be so large as to be prevented by their Pacific operations, limited as these must be. What will ~~happen~~<sup>happen to</sup> ~~is~~<sup>be</sup> for a vast United States' Army of ten millions <sup>to be created</sup> which, for at least two years while it was training would absorb all the available supplies and stand idle defending the American Continent. The best way of preventing the creation of such a situation and obtaining the proper use of the large forces and ample supplies of munitions which will presently be forthcoming, is to enable the Americans to regain their Naval power in the Pacific and not to discourage them from the precise secondary

overseas operations which they may perhaps  
contemplate.

20.12.41



~~SECRET~~  
*file*  
PRIME MINISTER TO LORD HALIFAX

Following for President from "Rejoined" Naval Person.

Impossible to reach mouth of POTOMAC before 6.30.p.m. E.S.T. which would be too late for plan you have so kindly made for us. Can anchor Hampton Roads Gate 4.15.p.m. E.S.T.

I should like to come on by aircraft to Washington Airfield reaching you in time for dinner.

If weather prevents this could I have a train to Washington from whatever is most convenient starting point in the vicinity of Hampton Roads?

Please on no account come out to meet me either way. Looking forward so much to seeing you at the White House. WINSTON.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 18th, 1941.

Personal

*file* <sup>11</sup>

Dear Mr. President,

I have just received a message from the Prime Minister asking me to thank you for your most kind invitation to stay at the White House, which he is delighted to accept. He proposes that his party at the White House should consist of only himself, his personal assistant Commander Thompson, his secretary Mr. Martin, his valet, and his two detectives. Accommodation for the remainder of the Prime Minister's party is being obtained at the Mayflower Hotel, where Lord Beaverbrook's party and Mr. Harriman are also to stay.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

*Halifax*

The Honourable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States  
of America,  
Washington, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Reference your telephone  
conversation this morning.

George W. Renchard

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

TK  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC).

London

Dated December 12, 1941

Rec'd 5:21 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6012, December 12, 11 a.m.

**TOP SECRET** AND PERSONNEL FROM THE PRIME MINISTER  
TO THE PRESIDENT.

*OK by Adm  
Ingersoll  
& Turner.  
Adm Ingersoll  
says to  
issue  
orders.*  
"One. We feel it necessary to divert Eighteenth  
Division now rounding the Cape in your transports  
to Bombay to reinforce army we are forming against  
Japanese invasion of Burma and Malay. I hope you  
will allow your ships to take them there instead  
of to Suez. Route is both shorter and safer.

Two. Our previous telegrams. Thank you so  
much. Hope rendezvous will be about 21st. I am  
enormously relieved at turn world events have taken."

WINANT

KLP

*I Think OK. Check A-N.  
Trip reply for me - F. White*

*F. White*

*Cleared  
A-N. State sent  
reply. - J.P.B.*

ALH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 11, 1941

Rec'd 1:16 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

6002, December 11, 6 p.m.

TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I see reports that Admiral Leahy is to leave Vichy. Am most anxious to discuss with you offering Vichy blessings or cursings on the morrow of a victory in Libya. Trust your link with Petain will not be broken meanwhile. We have no other worthwhile connection.

WINANT

NPL

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated December 10, 1941

Rec'd 1:02 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

5976, December 10, 6 p.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM THE FORMER NAVAL  
PERSON FOR THE PRESIDENT.

"We do not think there is any serious danger about return journey. There is, however, great danger in our not having a full discussion on the highest level about the extreme gravity of the naval position as well as upon all the production and allocation issues involved. I am quite ready to meet you at Bermuda or to fly from Bermuda to Washington. I feel it would be disastrous to wait for another month before we settled common action in face of new adverse situation particularly in Pacific. I had hoped to start tomorrow night, but will postpone my sailing till I have received rendezvous from you. I never felt so sure about the final victory, but only concerted action will achieve it. Kindest regards."

WINANT

NPL



1304  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

PD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated November 21, 1941

Rec'd 7:35 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

5596, November 21, 10 p.m.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

"One. News of first three days operations in Libya indicates that our armoured forces have been successfully engaged with bulk of German armoured forces in area Sidi Rezegh--Capuzzo

Two. On nineteenth November first action of Fourth Armoured Brigade (all American tanks) resulted in withdrawal Twenty-first German Armoured Division with loss of 26 tanks against 20 of our own. Action was resumed the following morning and enemy again withdrew with additional losses.

Three. On afternoon twentieth November our Seventh Armoured Brigade inflicted casualties estimated at 70 tanks, 33 armoured cars and several hundred prisoners on detachment Fifteenth German Armoured Division east of Sidi Rezegh, where we captured

-2- #5596, November 21, 10 p.m. from London

captured 19 aircraft and crews complete.

Four. The Italian armoured division which our troops successfully engaged on eighteenth November has taken no further part in the battle.

Five. On afternoon twentieth November our armored forces were concentrating to engage enemy tanks and M.T. in area Capuzzo--Bardia.

Six. Air battle is developing favorably. Enemy bomber effort has been reduced by low-flying attacks on enemy aerodromes and 14 Ju.8's were burnt out yesterday on ground. Little enemy air interference has been experienced so far with our land operations.

Seven. Our fighter sweeps have been active and on twentieth November knocked down 4 Me.110's 3 Me.109's, 2 Ju.87's, and one Ju.88 certain, at cost of 4 fighters. R.A.F. is flying ammunition up for Fourth Armoured Brigade.

Eight. This shows that our operations in Western Desert have made a very encouraging start."

WINANT

GW

*Pres.*  
*Jack Bay*

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

MA

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated November 18, 1941

Rec'd. 6:25 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

5503, November 18, midnight.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

One. We are immensely encouraged by your Neutrality amendment.

Two. Words in my letter "some time during the fall" mean now. Kindest regards.

WINANT

EMB

BoY  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

ALH

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated November 9, 1941

Rec'd 6:51 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

5346, November 9, midnight.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"The destruction of the two Axis convoys destined for Benghazi between Italy and Greece is highly important both in itself and in its consequences. It is also noteworthy that the two Italian heavy cruisers would not face our two six-inch light cruisers nor their six destroyers our two.

.Two. Have also an increasingly good impression of the Moscow front."

WINANT

LMS



**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

MJB  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased  
before being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated October 9, 1941

Rec'd 9:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4801, October 9, 2 a.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~TOP SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"Fully understand situation which can quite well be coped with here. We definitely prefer your second alternative of sending our troops to Halifax for transshipment and onward passage to Near East in United States escorts so far as needful. This plan lessens greatly dislocation of complex escort programmes and delay in subsequent convoys. Furthermore your valuable fast ships would not run any appreciable risk from U-boat attack by having to run in and out of the danger zones. If you agree our experts can make a firm programme whereby nine British liners arrive at Halifax with 20,800 men comprising the eighteenth division and start transshipment to your transports on November 7."

WINANT

RR

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

PM  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated October 5, 1941

Rec'd 8:43 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4730, October 5, 8 a.m.

**TOP SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT  
FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. I have heard from Halifax of his  
talks with you and Harry about the Middle East.  
I take a favourable view of the near future there.  
I am sending Mr. Atlee, the Lord Privy Seal, to  
represent us at the International Labour Office  
Convention to be held on 27th instant, at which  
I understand you will be present. He will bring  
you a long letter from me dealing with matters of  
the utmost secrecy and importance, which I cannot  
trust to the cables. He will also be able to give  
you full information about our organization in  
Cairo. Meanwhile you should know that I arranged  
some time ago that General Auchinleck should have  
complete authority over the air as well as over  
the army whenever major operations are impending  
or in

-2- #4730, October 5, 8 a.m., from London.

or in progress. The Lord Privy Seal will start by air around 23rd, and I trust you will be able to see him on arrival. I can only spare him for a fortnight on account of Parliamentary business.

Two. Max and AVERELL seem to have had great success at Moscow, and now the vital thing is to act up to our bargain in early deliveries. Hitler evidently feels the draught. We made almost exactly two thousand aircraft in September, and I think our first line strength tonight is slightly ahead of the Germans. Besides this the Russian air force is still very formidable.

Three. All my best wishes and kindest regards. How I wish we could have another talk."

WINANT.

HTM

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated Sept. 30, 1941

Rec'd 7:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

4613, September 30, 11 a.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"One. I am most grateful to you for your encouraging cable about tanks available for export by mid-1942. They more than restore the expectations we had prior to the recent conference.

Two. Losses at sea have been heavier towards the end of the month and some convoys have suffered very severely. Actually the quarter ending September is one-third losses of the quarter ending June but I fear a hard time in October when the balance of light and darkness favours the U-boats.

Three. The Harriman-Beaverbrook combination are firmly knit together. I hope for a successful agreement with Stalin. On the whole the last week on the Russian front has been better than we feared. Kindest regards."

WINANT

KLP



BOX

AF  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated Sept. 22, 1941

Rec'd 11:12 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

4431, September 22, 4 p.m.

PERSONAL AND **SECRET** FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON:

"Your cheering cable about tanks arrived when  
we were feeling very blue about all we have to give  
up to Russia. The prospect of nearly doubling the  
previous figures encouraged everyone. The missions  
have started in great goodwill and friendship.

Kindest regards."

WINANT

ALC

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

GS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated September 1, 1941

Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

TRIPLE PRIORITY

4014, September 1, Midnight

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
TO PRESIDENT

"One. The good results which have been so smoothly obtained in Persia puts us in touch with the Russians and we propose to double or at least greatly improve the railway from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian, thus opening a sure route by which long-term supplies can reach the Russian reserve positions in the Volga basin. Besides this there is the importance of encouraging Turkey to stand as a solid block against German passage to Syria and Palestine. In view of both these important objectives I wish to reinforce the Middle East armies with two regular British divisions, 40,000 men, in addition to the 150,000 drafts and units which we are carrying ourselves between now and Christmas. We can not, however, manage to find the whole of the shipping by ourselves. Would it be possible for you

to lend

-2- 4014, September 1, 12 p.m.

to lend us twelve United States liners and twenty United States cargo ships manned by American crews from early October till February. These would come carrying cargo to United Kingdom ports under any flag arrangement convenient. If they could arrive here early in October, we would send them forward as additions to our October and November convoys to the Middle East.

Two. I know, Mr. President, from our talks that this will be difficult to do, but there is a great need for more British troops in the Middle East and it will be an enormous advantage if we can hold Turkey and sustain Russia, and by so doing bar further advance eastward by Hitler. It is quite true that the loan of these liners would hamper any large dispatch of United States forces to Europe or Africa, but as you know I have never asked for this in any period we can reasonably foresee in the near future.

Three. It is for you to say what you would require in replacements of ships sunk by enemy action. Hitherto we have lost hardly anything in our well guarded troop convoys. I am sure this would be a wise and practical step to take at the present juncture and I shall be very grateful if you can make it possible."

WINANT

KLP

AF

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated August 29, 1941

Rec'd 3 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

3978, August 29, 8 p.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FROM FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
TO THE PRESIDENT.

Dated August 28th.

Operation PILGRIM which I mentioned to you. We have now found a way of being able to execute this, if necessary, after the month of September has passed and indeed during the winter months. We shall not, therefore, be forced to move unless provocation has been given beforehand, either by German invasion of peninsula or Spanish connivance in undue infiltration or actual Spanish attack upon Gibraltar. This makes things much easier and also will present a better footing for any action you might take elsewhere. Meanwhile, we are keeping forces at about ten days notice. Trouble may well arise in latter part of September.

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WINANT

AIC



*Pre-Bureau*

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UNCLASSIFIED**

*Rec'd 7/29/41  
JAB.*

TEM

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated July 25, 1941

Rec'd 9:37 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3196, July 25, 2 p.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

I am most grateful for your message about the tank programme. This addition to our tank resources in the coming critical months is splendid. As to the longer term policy all our experience goes to show that more heavily armed and armoured vehicles are required for modern battle and we should, therefore, plan to increase the output of medium tanks at the expense of light tanks, but not, of course, at the expense of your air programme.

Two. I am much interested in your suggestion that men for our tank corps should be trained in the United States. We are examining it here and will let you know our views as soon as possible.

Three. We have been considering here our war plans, not only for the fighting of 1942 but also for 1943. After providing for the security of essential

**SECRET** bases it

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 3196, July 25, 2 p.m. from London.


bases it is necessary to plan on the largest scale the forces needed for victory. In broad outline, we must aim first at intensifying the blockade and propaganda. Then, we must subject Germany and Italy to a ceaseless and ever growing air bombardment. These measures may themselves produce an internal convulsion or collapse. But plans ought also to be made for coming to the aid of the conquered populations by landing armies of liberation when opportunity is ripe. For this purpose it will be necessary, not only to have great numbers of tanks but also of vessels capable of carrying them and landing them direct on to beaches. It ought not to be difficult for you to make the necessary adaption in some of the vast numbers of merchant vessels you are building so as to fit them for tank-landing fast ships.

Four. If you agree with this broad conception of bringing Germany to her knees, we should not lose a moment in:

(A) framing an agreed estimate as to our joint requirements of the primary weapons of war; e.g., aircraft, tanks, etc.

(B) Therefore, considering how these requirements are to be met by our joint production.


Five.

  
-3- 3196, July 25, 2 p.m. from London.

Five. Meanwhile I suggest that our combined  
staffs in London should set to work as soon as possible  
on (A) and that thereafter our technical experts should  
proceed with (B)."

WINANT

ALC

  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
DIVISION OF DEFENSE AID REPORTS  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*Lock box*

July 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In compliance with your memorandum to me of July 28, 1941, the following suggested reply, which has been approved by General Marshall, is submitted for your approval:

"Reference 3196:

"1. Very glad you are pleased with our tank program. I will bear in mind your ideas of priorities as between airplanes, medium tanks and light tanks.

"2. I will await your views with reference to training men for your tank corps in this country.

"3. I have directed that studies, plans and recommendations be made reference the construction of large numbers of tank-landing fast ships and will advise you thereof.

"4. & 5. Prior to your cable, I had directed that a committee, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of War, recommend to me the overall production effort in aircraft, tanks, ships, guns, etc., which is needed for victory. This organization is at work and is considering British Empire production figures, Axis production figures and United States production figures with a view to recommending any additional production effort required. Recommendations will be coordinated with your representatives."

*J. H. Burns*  
J. H. BURNS,

Major General, U. S. Army,  
Executive Officer.

2 Inclosures:

Telegram 3196, 7-25-41.

F.D.R. Memo 7-28-41.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of *State Dept.*

*Letter, 8/14/69*

By *RAA* Date *FEB 3 1972*

**SECRET**



War Folder  
2-41

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

Hyde Park, N. Y.  
July 28, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MAJOR GENERAL JAMES H. BURNS

Will you be good enough to  
speak to General Marshall about the  
enclosed and jointly prepare a  
memorandum of reply for my signature?

F. D. R.

Message from the Former  
Naval Person to the President, dated  
July 25, 1941, re tank programme.

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

*Return to him.*

KD

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd. 10:47 a. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2872, July 7, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM  
THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

One. I was encouraged and relieved to read the documents on defence plan Number Three. Putting such a plan into immediate operation would give timely and needed aid. At present the strain upon our resources is far too great.

Two. The Battle of the Atlantic continually changes. Owing to the U-boats working ever farther West we have recently been forced to provide a diagonal escorts for the East bound convoys throughout their passage and instead of dispersing the West bound convoys when they were about half way across the Atlantic, we now have to keep these convoys intact and provide a diagonals escorts for them almost up to Newfoundland.

The effect of this has been that the strength of the escorts is now only about half of what was

found

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UNCLASSIFIED

-2- #2872, July 7, 4 p. m. (SECTION ONE), from London.

found necessary when we only had to escort up to 35 degrees West. We are extremely doubtful whether these reduced escorts will be sufficient to protect the convoys enough.

Three. We have so far only had one trial of strength over a convoy with this reduced protection, with the result that five ships of the convoy were sunk and two ships damaged and three U-boats were sunk. This was not unsatisfactory as we estimate that during its passage the convoy was attacked by no less than eight U-boats.

WINANT.

ALC

TK  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (S)

London

Dated July 7, 1941

Rec'd 10:45 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

2872, July 7, 4 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

The result however was only achieved by taking away the escorts from two west bound convoys which happened to be in the vicinity of the east bound convoy and thus reinforcing the east bound convoy. Bombing a west bound convoy of its escort means that the next east bound convoy must be inadequately defended and at this moment we are anxious about the safety of an east bound convoy which from this cause was left, ill protected.

Four. The introduction of defense plan number three would also enable us to give better protection to the Gibraltar and Freetown convoys which at present are poorly escorted or not escorted at all.

Five. Our anti-invasion plans would also be considerably strengthened by the introduction of defense plan number three as a larger part of our destroyer force which is at present in the Western Atlantic would be available on this side.

Six.



-2- #2872, July 7, 4 p.m., (SECTION TWO).

Six. We have been very lucky in rounding up all the eight enemy supply ships which were out and we feel that if we can keep the seas clear of them it will not only hamper their U-boat operations but also make it unlikely that they will send warship raiders onto the trade routes. Your striking and task forces with their aircraft carriers would no doubt play a dominating part in keeping the seas clear.

Seven. I was much concerned at Senator Wheeler's indiscretion or worse. Although he did not give any date for the sailing of the expedition to Iceland the danger of his statement lay in the fact that if the enemy had become aware that the expedition had sailed from Newfoundland but without knowing where it was going to, its destination was made clear by Wheeler. Had the enemy meant to interfere with this convoy they would have had time to move seven or eight U-boats to a suitable intercepting position. This is based on what we believe to be the present disposition of U-boats as revealed to us by D. F. bearings and signals and the positions in which convoys and independent ships have been attacked. I pray God your men will get there safely." (End message).

CSB

WINANT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Box

Confidentially returned  
to The President for  
his files by  
Capt. Beardsell

Emm

*Prel.*  
*Bof.*  
**REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED**

DES

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

LONDON

Dated July 1, 1941

Rec'd 3:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

2769, July 1, 9 p.m.

**SECRET** AND PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM THE  
FORMER NAVAL PERSON.

"I am most grateful for your telegram about American merchant ship building programme. This vast expansion opens up the prospects of the future and assures the means of continuing the war in this vital sphere to a victorious conclusion. I know you will feel with me the pain that such vast masses of tonnage should have to be sunk before being replaced by colossal American efforts. Any increase in our escorts will produce an immediate saving in losses. Forgive me mentioning this when I know all you are doing. The last ten days have been very fruitful in enemy submarine destruction. Four Germans, two Italians and a hostile Vichy boat having been certainly disposed of. We are also getting very good results with our own submarines in the Mediterranean against enemy merchant vessels and by our air attacks by bomb or torpedo upon them both in home waters and the Mediterranean.

I am

-2- 2769, July 1, 1941 from London

I am asking that everything here shall be at concert pitch for invasion from September 1st. I trust your health continues good."

WINANT

CSB



*Box*

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM THE PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA  
TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN, DATED JANUARY  
23rd, 1942.

~~SECRET~~  
By Authority of *Lt. Australia*

*Archives dtd 23 May 1974*

by *DBL* JUN 14 1974

I am communicating the following message as the result of  
an emergency meeting of the War Cabinet summoned today to consider  
reports on the situation in Malaya and New Guinea.

PART I. MALAYA:

1. The General Officer commanding the Australian Imperial Forces in Malaya reports that part of his force has been cut off without possibility of relief. It would appear from the information received regarding the disposition of the A.I.F. and its operation that the support for it has not been forthcoming.
2. Whilst we have no intention of suggesting any criticism of the Indians who are fighting the common foe, we are greatly disturbed by the references made by the General Officer Commanding the A.I.F. to their unsuitability for this type of warfare. If this is correct, we hope you are not placing too much reliance on the mere numerical strength of the land forces you are sending without regard to their qualities.
3. Page has reported the Defence Committee has been considering the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore. After all the assurances we have been given, the evacuation of Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal. Singapore is a central fortress in the system of Empire and local defence. As stated in my telegram No.17, we understood it was to be made impregnable and in any event it was to be capable of holding out for a prolonged period until the arrival of the main Fleet.
4. Even in an emergency, diversion of reinforcements should be to the Netherlands East Indies and not to Burma. Anything else would be deeply resented and might force the N.E.I. to make a separate peace.
5. On the faith of the proposed flow of reinforcements we have acted and carried out our part of the bargain. We expect you not to frustrate the whole purpose by the evacuation.

PART II. THE PACIFIC.

6. The heavy scale of the Japanese attack on Rabaul, where, including other parts of the Bismarck Archipelago, there is a force of 1700, and the probability of occupation if such has not already occurred, presage an early attack on Port Moresby.

7. The strength of the Australian troops at Port Moresby is 5500. Great importance is attached to this centre by our Chiefs of Staff as it is the only base in this region from which control can be exercised of the Torres Straits, which is most direct line of supply to Darwin, the N.E.I. and Malaya, for which it is being extensively used. In the absence of Rabaul, Port Moresby is the only base for offensive operations against the Caroline and Marshall Islands when British and American strength permits of counter-offensive action.

8. Any projected American Naval operations in the vicinity of the Gilbert Islands, if carried on towards the Japanese bases in the Marshalls, by threatening their flank, <sup>would</sup> form a valuable diversion from the Japanese southward advance from Rabaul, and would be a great help to us. Chief of Naval Staff Australia is communicating direct with Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, following the arrangements relating to the Anzac area, offering our forces and seeking his co-operation in this offensive action against the Japanese. The assistance of yourself and your naval advisers in influencing such a move would be most helpful.

9. Our advisers state that submarines would form a most valuable addition to the defence of Port Moresby, where there is every facility for them to operate and it is requested that if possible some may be allotted to that base.

10. We are in full agreement with the concluding sentence of the New Zealand reply on the Anzac area to the effect that unified command over all naval forces engaged in the war against Japan and the eventual formation of a fleet superior to the Japanese capable of wresting from our enemies the command of the Western Pacific remains essential to the defeat of Japan. We expect that the best immediate measures will be taken to remedy the situation.

PART III. AIRCRAFT.

11. Our experiences at Ambon and Rabul have emphasised the urgent necessity for fighter aircraft immediately. Japanese methods make it clear that without fighter protection for our aerodromes, there is every prospect of carrier-borne enemy air attack destroying our extremely limited striking force on the ground by low attack, designed to search out individual aircraft. These tactics may be practised with impunity by the enemy against our mainland aerodromes as well as at advanced bases, owing to lack of fighter protection and almost complete absence of gun defences. A request is made for immediate allotment to the R.A.A.F. of up to 250 fighter aircraft of Tomahawk, Hurricane II or similar type.

12. It is impossible to expect us to give effective resistance with the inadequate aircraft at our disposal and we desire the allotment to the R.A.A.F. of U.S. aircraft of suitable type - already in Australia or which are likely to arrive shortly. This reinforcement would be in substitution of aircraft long since ordered for R.A.A.F. expansion programme but not yet delivered from United States.

13. Your support of the above proposal with United States authorities is requested, together with an immediate arrangement for the allocation to the R.A.A.F. for use at Port Moresby of a squadron of the United States P.40 fighter aircraft approaching completion at Townsville. General Brereton has communicated this request to Commander in Chief of A.B.D.A. area, for whose area the aircraft are intended but we ask that the authority controlling General Wavell should direct that it be approved.

PART IV. GENERAL:

14. The trend of the situation in Malaya and the attack on Rabaul are giving rise to a public feeling of grave uneasiness at Allied impotence to do anything to stem the Japanese advance. The Government is realising its responsibility to prepare the public for the possibility of resisting an aggressor, also has a duty and obligation to explain why it may not have been possible to prevent the enemy from reaching our shores. It is therefore in duty bound to exhaust all the possibilities of the situation, the more so since the Australian people, having volunteered for service overseas

in large numbers, find it difficult to understand why they must wait so long for an improvement in the situation when irreparable damage may have been done to their power to resist, the prestige of the Empire and solidarity of the Allied cause.

\*\*\*\*\*



*The President's copy*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*For his files*  
*H.E.*

3rd January, 1942

DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT.

As a result of proposals put forward by the American and British Chiefs of Staff, and of their recommendations to President Roosevelt and to the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, it is announced that, with the concurrence of the Netherlands Government and of the Dominion Governments concerned, a system of unified Command will be established in the South West Pacific Area.

2. All the forces in this area, sea, land and air, will operate under one Supreme Commander. At the suggestion of the President, in which all concerned have agreed, General Sir A. Wavell has been appointed to this Command.

3. Major-General George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps of the U.S. Army, will be appointed Deputy Supreme Commander. He is now in the Far East. Under the direction of General Wavell, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy, will assume Command of all naval forces in the area. General Sir Henry Pownall will be Chief of Staff to General Wavell.

4. General Wavell will assume his Command in the near future.

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHERCollect { Full rate  
Day letter  
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Charge Department:

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## TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington.

February 10, 1942.

AMEMBASSY

LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

I am sending through Halifax and Winant a reply to the proposal of an exchange of notes relating to Article VII of the proposed interim Lease-Lend Agreement. The notes as drafted do not express my understanding of the Article and its purpose. There is no suggestion in the Article (as some of your colleagues have expressed it) of bartering Empire sovereignty to meet a debt, and it is wholly understood that, before any commitment is made modifying the system, the Dominions must be consulted. Where I differ from the statement in the proposed note is in the exclusion of Empire preference or any other special preference arrangement, either ours or yours, from the scope of the discussions and the area within which agreement of all concerned is to be sought. I still believe that a simple acceptance of the draft would be by far the best

Enciphered by .....

Sent by operator ..... M., ..... 19.....

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

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Charge Departments:

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# TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTIAL  
PLAIN

## Department of State

Washington,

best method of achieving the purposes of both our countries and of demonstrating the unity of those purposes and of the American and British people. The Article offers a road to the settlement of our mutual and world problems to which all can rally against the misery and slavery of Hitler's New Order. I hope that we can move forward boldly along that road. The Article makes it plain that all conclusions must be reached by agreement after discussion of all the objectives mentioned and with the participation of all countries concerned. This is the method of free peoples, and insures that no existing arrangements are or can be affected without the consent of those involved.

You will agree, I know, that the pressing matter now is to reach an agreement. If it will help you to this, we can record in notes the assurances which have already been given, although as I have said this seems to me to dilute the effect of agreement with an atmosphere of caution. The message sent through the State Department carries the texts which do this. I am counting upon your help to conclude this matter in the next few days.

A-A:DA:PK:BE

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_

M.,

19\_\_\_\_



WSC

January 29, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
LONDON

For your information here is the latest on the Vichy situation:

1. On January 20th I sent the following statement of our policy to Petain through Leahy:

"Here are some thoughts which you could use if the occasion offered -- either with Marshal Petain or General Weygand.

1. It is most important for the French Government and the French people to realize that the President of the United States is about the best friend they have; that one of his greatest wishes is to see France reconstituted in the post-war period in accordance with its splendid position in history.

2. The word 'France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire.

3. The attack on the United States and the declaration of war must make the French Government and people realize that any act on their part either at home or in the colonies which would give aid and comfort to the Germans or Italians must, of necessity, help the Germans and hurt the United States. The United States could not, of course, take such a hostile act lying down. That is just common sense which the French should realize.

4. Now that the United States is in the war, it should be perfectly clear to the French Government and the French people that if Germany or Italy attacked unoccupied France or any of the French



Colonies, in any way, the President could not regard acquiescence to such an attack as anything else than playing the German game.

5. On the other hand, resistance by the French against Germany or Italian attack either in France itself or in any part of the Colonial Empire would be regarded by the President as a normal and natural reaction. Such resistance would have not only the moral support of the United States, but it would also have the physical support of the United States by every possible military and naval assistance we could bring to bear.

The above seems to me almost like a primer because it is wholly logical and wholly simple".

2. Today I have received a message from Leahy saying that he had delivered my message to the Marshal orally and told him that the President's message was confirmatory of what he, Leahy, had already said many times.

3. The Marshal (Darlan and Rochat being present) said in effect:

(a) That the French Government would resist any invasion by the Gaullists, the Germans, the British, or the Americans.

(b) That there is no longer any question of using the French Fleet in an unfriendly way.

(c) That there is no longer any question at the present time of Germany using bases in North Africa.

(d) That there is no pending question of the Germans making an invasion of Africa from any direction, including Spain.

4. When Leahy asked the old gentleman if he would accept military or naval aid from the United States if French Africa were invaded by Germany or Italy or both, the Marshal made the somewhat cryptic reply "If we ask for it".

5. At the same interview Darlan said he had heard that South Africa might make an attack on Madagascar

and that this would make Vichy very angry. Darlan also hoped that the Saint Pierre-Miquelon affair would soon be settled.

6. It seems to be Leahy's present opinion that if Germany tries to move into French Africa, the Vichy Government cannot be expected to give any cooperation whatsoever to the United States.

7. Thus the situation seems to me no better and no worse than it was when you left here and the flying trapeze can, therefore, remain in statu quo.

ROOSEVELT




THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to our conversation on Sunday regarding the British reply to your message urging the acceptance of the interim Lease-Lend agreement and your instructions to me at that time, I have prepared for your consideration a message from you to the Prime Minister and a draft of memorandum to be presented to the British Government through Ambassador Winant. Attached to this memorandum is a modification of the British proposed exchange of notes redrafted to conform with the position which this Department has taken under your instructions. If these messages meet with your approval, we can send them off at once.

Faithfully yours,



The President,  
The White House.

Enclosures.



DRAFT

2/9/42  
5:30 P.M.

The Government of the United States finds it impossible to accept the text of the notes proposed in the memorandum from Lord Halifax dated February 7, 1942, because paragraph four of the proposed note from the Government of the United States to the Government of the United Kingdom alters rather than elucidates the meaning of Article VII of the Interim Agreement. The natural and inescapable meaning of paragraph four is that in the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom preferential arrangements between the Dominions and the United Kingdom and--although the language is here obscure--the United States and, say, the Philippines would be reserved from consideration because falling entirely outside the ambit of the Article. Paragraph four then continues to suggest that should the United Kingdom and the Dominions consent thereto, the consideration of modification of the system of Imperial Preferences might be brought within the scope of the matters to be considered in the final settlement. The Government of the United States has never contemplated or expressed the foregoing interpretation



interpretation of Article VII and cannot now agree to it.

My Government has on numerous occasions expressed orally that it is not the intention of Article VII to commit either Government to any unilateral action. The final settlement is to be reached by agreement. Agreement is to be sought upon a many-sided program of action along the lines of all the objectives stated in the Article. A plan is outlined, not a list of isolated points, and nothing falling within the scope of the plan is excluded or reserved from consideration and agreement. The participation of other Governments is specifically contemplated. Wherever a change in existing arrangements may be involved, the parties to those arrangements will naturally be consulted - as the Article even more broadly provides - and their agreement sought.

Article VII is not <sup>itself</sup> a settlement. It offers an avenue by which the settlement may be reached and commits the parties to that road. It may fail. It certainly will

fail

fail if either nation insists upon holding back some cherished item from the common effort. The imperative task, today, is to keep open the road to a settlement which can be the foundation of a lasting peace.

In the opinion of my Government the purposes which both Governments are seeking can best be served by simple agreement upon the draft without an exchange of notes which may appear to the peoples of our two countries and of other countries to indicate a halting and cautious rather than a broad and united approach toward the problems of the war and post-war period. If, however, His Majesty's Government believes that a formal exchange of notes recording understandings reached during the course of the negotiations is desirable, my Government is willing to enter into an exchange of notes with His Majesty's Government along the lines <sup>of the drafts</sup> attached hereto.

In as much as the need for an Interim Agreement is pressing, a reply to this memorandum is requested at the earliest convenient moment.

(Draft 2/10/42 - 10:30 a.m.)

Note from His Majesty's Government to Mr. Winant.

Your Excellency, I have the honour to refer to the conversations which have taken place between the representatives of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in connection with Article VII of the Lease-Lend interim agreement signed this day.

2. During the course of these conversations the representatives of both governments have indicated that their governments fully appreciate the post-war problems which will confront the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and of other countries which may subsequently participate in agreed action for the attainment of the objectives stated in the said Article VII.

3. The representatives of both governments have referred to the dependence of the United Kingdom on international trade and to the severity of the problem

of



of the problem of the balance of payments with which the Government of the United Kingdom will have to deal in the post-war period and they have recognized the necessity for taking this problem into account in formulating agreed action to attain the ends of Article VII.

4. The representatives of the United Kingdom Government have stated that before accepting any commitments modifying the existing system of Imperial Preference, the Government of the United Kingdom would naturally require to consult the Governments of the Dominions, and have further stated their understanding that nothing in Article VII binds either contracting Government to take action unilaterally without regard to action by the other as may be agreed to after discussion of all the objectives stated in that Article.

5. The representatives of the Government of the United Kingdom have referred to problems which will

confront



confront all Governments, including the United States Government, in pursuit of the objectives stated in Article VII, relating to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers as part of a system of world trade that the respective Governments by Article VII are striving to attain.

6. I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom in signing the agreement referred to above, that each contracting Government in concerting measures necessary for the attainment in common accord of the objectives envisaged in Article VII, will take fully into account the problems and conditions set forth in the preceding paragraphs. I shall therefore be grateful if Your Excellency will furnish me with an assurance

that

that this is also the understanding of the Government of the United States..

Mr. Winant's Reply.

Your Excellency, I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of this day's date, in which you were so good as to recapitulate the various problems and conditions which should be taken into account in connection with Article VII of the Lease-Lend provisional agreement, which we have signed to-day.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States entirely shares the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards the desirability of taking fully into account all the problems and conditions to which allusion is made in Your Excellency's note.

~~BRITISH EMBASSY,~~

~~WASHINGTON, D. C.~~

~~February 7th, 1942.~~

*B.H.F.*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File  
Confidential*

Feb. 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: DEAN ACHESON

We have received a confidential wire from Mr. Winant who says that the War Cabinet yesterday tentatively decided to reject the Lend-Lease draft agreement and they are meeting tomorrow to prepare a counter proposal.

Mr. Winant and Secretary Hull both believe that a personal message from the President to Mr. Churchill is the only hope for getting the present draft accepted.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3:00 P.M. Feb. 4, 1942.

This is a proposed message from the  
President to the Prime Minister:

I have asked the State Department through  
Halifax and Winant to express to the British  
Government my strong hope that it promptly agree  
to the present draft of interim Lend-Lease agree-  
ment and I now ask your personal help in bringing  
this about.

I understand your need of maintaining unity  
at home in the great task of winning the war.  
I know you also understand how essential it is  
that we maintain unity of purpose between our  
two governments and peoples in this and equally  
important in the unfinished tasks that will follow  
it.

I am convinced that further delay in con-  
cluding this agreement will be harmful to your  
interests and ours. I am likewise convinced that  
the present draft is not only fair and equitable  
but it meets the apprehension which some of your  
colleagues have felt and which Halifax has brought  
to our attention.

No one knows better than I how busy you are.  
I should not add this matter to the long list of  
your worries if after giving it much personal  
attention I were not convinced that a failure  
to sign this agreement would do much mischief.

(Dictated by Dean Acheson, after talking  
with Secy. Hull and Mr. Hopkins)







10, Downing Street,  
Whitehall.

5. At the same time, His Excellency  
Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek  
has accepted the Supreme Command  
over all land and air forces of  
the United Nations which are now  
or may in the future be operating  
in the Chinese theatre, including  
initially such portions of Indo-China  
and Thailand as may become available  
to troops of the United Nations.  
American and British representatives  
will serve on his joint headquarters  
Planning Staff.

TELEGRAM

**[REDACTED]**  
FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: AMEMBASSY  
LONDON

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR CHURCHILL FROM HOPKINS

APROPOS OF YOUR TELEPHONE CALL I TALKED TO THE PRESIDENT  
LAST NIGHT AND HE SEES NO DIFFICULTY WHATEVER IN CHINA SITTING  
IN ON YOUR PACIFIC COUNCIL IN LONDON.

HOPKINS

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date 2/11/72

Alternative Draft

Quote I have no objection to your proposal for  
announcing Air Marshal Peirse as Commander in Chief of  
the Air Forces in ABDA, although I would have preferred  
to wait a few days because of public reaction following  
the withdrawal of Admiral Hart from the Naval Command

Unquote

1

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JANUARY 31, 1942

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
LONDON

DILL IS OUT OF TOWN BUT I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I DEEPLY HOPE HE WILL STAY AND SIT ON THE JOINT STAFF IN ADDITION TO WEEMYS AND NAVY AND AIR. THERE IS NO REASON WHY THE STAFF SHOULD NOT BE COMPOSED OF THE ABOVE FOUR AND ALSO STARK, MARSHALL, ARNOLD AND KING.

THERE SEEMS TO BE ONLY ONE QUESTION AND THAT IS JUST WHOM DILL WOULD REPRESENT. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO HIS REPRESENTING THE JOINT STAFFS IN LONDON BUT I PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT I CAN REGARD HIM AS THE REPRESENTATIVE OF YOU IN YOUR CAPACITY AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. PERRAPS THIS LATTER STATUS COULD BE UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN YOU AND ME.

ALL OF THIS IS WHOLLY AGREEABLE TO MY PEOPLE ON THE JOINT STAFF AND ALSO TO HARRY.

ROOSEVELT



*Boyl.*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1942

Miss Tully:

This cable was sent over to  
the State Department Code Room  
Friday night at 9:45. It had been  
approved by the President.

LMB

TELEGRAM

February 6, 1942

TO: THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

ADMIRAL HART HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED BECAUSE OF ILL HEALTH. I BELIEVE THE THING TO DO IS TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER WAVELL AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED INCLUDING PEERSE. THIS WILL HANDLE THE MATTER SATISFACTORILY FOR THE PRESENT AND WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE CHANGES LATER IF THAT SEEMS DESIRABLE. THIS PROPOSAL IS IN HANDS OF CHIEFS OF STAFF HERE BUT I WANTED TO SEND YOU MY PERSONAL VIEW. CAN WE NOT SETTLE THIS WITH FINALITY BY SUNDAY.

HARRY GAVE ME YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SINKINGS IN WESTERN ATLANTIC. THIS MATTER IS BEING GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION BY STARK, KING AND ME. WE HAD A GOOD GO AT THE JAPS IN MARSHALL ISLANDS. WE ARE PUSHING ON WITH MAGNET, WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date Oct 6 1971

COPY  
TELEGRAM

STATE DEPARTMENT NO. 465

February 6, 1942

TO: FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
FROM: THE PRESIDENT.

ADMIRAL HART HAS ASKED TO BE RELIEVED BECAUSE OF ILL HEALTH. I BELIEVE THE THING TO DO IS TO LET THE DUTCHMAN GO IN AS ACTING COMMANDER AND CHIEF OF ALL NAVAL FORCES LEAVING ALL OTHER COMMANDS UNDER WAVELL AS AT PRESENT CONSTITUTED INCLUDING PEESE. THIS WILL HANDLE THE MATTER SATISFACTORILY FOR THE PRESENT AND WILL PERMIT US TO MAKE CHANGES LATER IF THAT SEEMS DESIRABLE. THIS PROPOSAL IS IN HANDS OF CHIEFS OF STAFF HERE BUT I WANTED TO SEND YOU MY PERSONAL VIEW. CAN WE NOT SETTLE THIS WITH FINALITY BY SUNDAY.

HARRY GAVE ME YOUR MESSAGE ABOUT SINKINGS IN WESTERN ATLANTIC. THIS MATTER IS BEING GIVEN URGENT CONSIDERATION BY STARK, KING AND ME. WE HAD A GOOD GO AT THE JAPS IN MARSHALL ISLANDS. WE ARE PUSHING ON WITH MAGNET. WARM REGARDS.

ROOSEVELT

*This was sent prior to establishment of  
"R-C" Serial file and is filed for information  
only. Earl*

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W.F. Stewart  
Date Oct 6 1971

ROUGH DRAFT.

OP10-KR

February 9, 1942.

From: The President.  
To: The Prime Minister.

#101 The combined Chiefs of Staff have been directed to inform Wavell ~~that he is directed~~ to designate Vice Admiral Helfrich as Acting Commander of Combined Naval Forces in ABDA Area. Suggest that we issue press release simultaneously from London and Washington at 2 p.m. G.C.T. Wednesday 11 February as follows:

*Quote* "In view Admiral Hart's request to be relieved because of ill health Vice Admiral Helfrich has been designated as acting Commander Combined Naval Forces ABDA Area." *Unquote*

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By

*W.F. Stewart*

Date

*OCT 6 1971*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

101



Alternative Draft

Quote I have no objection to your proposal for  
announcing Air Marshal Peirse as Commander in Chief of  
the Air Forces in ABDA, although I would have preferred  
to wait a few days because of public reaction following  
the withdrawal of Admiral Hart from the Naval Command  
Unquote

G.TP15

TELEGRAM

January 30, 1942

*Original and  
two copies to be  
returned to Capt 4  
M-Crea at White House*

                      
TO: AMEMBASSY LONDON

*From: Opnav.  
To: Alusena London  
31/01/35*

*PP  
CR#587*

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE  
PRESIDENT.

1. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING WAVELL'S MESSAGE REGARDING  
OUR MAN IN THE ABDA AREA. WE HAVE HAD AN INDICATION HERE THAT HE  
FELT THAT HE WAS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THAT IMPORTANT COMMAND. IF A  
CHANGE IS MADE IT SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE MANY COMPELLING REASONS  
FOR PROMOTING THE DUTCHMAN, WHO IS APPARENTLY A VERY GOOD NAVAL  
OFFICER. IN THAT CASE I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE  
COMMAND OF THE AIR.

2. AS A MATTER OF FACT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT AIR  
FORCE IN THAT AREA. DO YOU THINK THIS COULD BE WORKED OUT? I  
REALIZE THAT PEARSE HAS JUST BEEN NAMED BUT IT MAY BE THAT WAVELL  
COULD GIVE HIM THE POST OF INTENDANT GENERAL NOW TEMPORARILY CHARGED  
TO GENERAL BRETT IN ADDITION TO HIS, BRETT'S, REGULARLY ASSIGNED  
ROLE AS DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER. WE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE POST  
OF DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER BEING TEMPORARILY LEFT VACANT IN ORDER  
THAT GENERAL BRETT MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO COMMAND THE COMBINED ABDA  
AIR FORCES. I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UNITED STATES  
HAVE ONE OF THE IMPORTANT COMMANDS IN THE ABDA AREA. WILL YOU  
LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W.S. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971

3 THE STAFF HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER OF INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS, THE DUTCH AND THE NEW ZEALANDERS IN THE JOINT STAFF CONFERENCES. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN ME A FINAL ANSWER, I THINK I CAN SAY THAT THEIR GENERAL FEELING, WITH WHICH I CONCUR, IS THAT ALL POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL MATTERS CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED IN LONDON AND THAT MILITARY MATTERS BE RESOLVED HERE.

4. HOWEVER, TO HAVE ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED EACH BY THREE MEN ON THE JOINT STAFF CONSIDERING ABDA PROBLEMS WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN ALTOGETHER UNWIELDY BODY. WE ARE ALL STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT THE PRESENT WORKING ORGANIZATION IS FUNCTIONING VERY EFFICIENTLY FOR THE COLLABORATION OF BRITISH - U.S. AFFAIRS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE MATTERS TO BE HANDLED. WE THINK IT SHOULD REMAIN AS AT PRESENT BUT WITH THIS IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENT TO MEET THE SPECIAL COMPLICATIONS OF THE ABDA AREA;

5 THAT IN CASES IN WHICH THE DUTCH, THE AUSTRALIANS AND THE NEW ZEALANDERS ARE CONCERNED THE COMBINED STAFF WILL INVITE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION OF SUCH MATTERS AS INVOLVE THEIR NATIONAL INTEREST AND COLLABORATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT IN THOSE CASES WHERE IMMEDIATE ACTION IS REQUIRED THE INDIVIDUAL ADVICE OF THE OFFICERS CONCERNED BE GIVEN WITHOUT WAITING FOR FORMAL WORD FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. F. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971

62

WE WILL UNDERTAKE HERE TO WORK OUT A CLOSE AND INTIMATE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE THREE MILITARY MISSIONS OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND MAKE SURE THAT THEIR ADVICE IS IN NO SENSE PERFUNCTORY BUT WILL BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING THE GENERAL POLICIES OF THE WAR IN THE ABDA AREA.

7. This seems to be our joint staff opinion here. What do you think?
8. Thank you very much for your wire. It is fun to be in the same dreads with you.
9. Congratulations on yesterday's vote. We also had our vote in opposition.

*Renshaw*

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date OCT 6 1971

Whitehouse (3 copies) to  
reproduce.

Sealed Secret

*Ham-42*  
*GUNEC*



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

7. This seems to be our joint staff opinion here. What do you think?
8. Thank you ever so much for your wire. It is fun to be in the same decade with you.
9. Congratulations on yesterday's vote. We also had one vote in opposition.

Roosevelt

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPT.

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <b>OPNAV</b>	FOR ACTION	<b>ALUSNA LONDON</b>	<b>PPPPPPPP</b>
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE <b>31 JAN 42</b>	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM			PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY <b>GLTUCKER</b>			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

310135 CR 0582

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
----------------------------------	------	------	-----

TEXT FROM THE PRESIDENT.

FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON (~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL)

1. I SHALL LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING WAVELL'S MESSAGE REGARDING OUR MAN IN THE ABDA AREA. WE HAVE HAD AN INDICATION HERE THAT HE FELT THAT HE WAS TOO OLD TO HANDLE THAT IMPORTANT COMMAND. IF A CHANGE IS MADE IT SEEMS TO ME THERE ARE MANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR PROMOTING THE DUTCHMAN, WHO IS APPARENTLY A VERY GOOD NAVAL OFFICER. IN THAT CASE I BELIEVE THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE COMMAND OF THE AIR.

2. AS A MATTER OF FACT WE ARE GOING TO HAVE THE PREDOMINANT AIR FORCE IN THAT AREA. DO YOU THINK THIS COULD BE WORKED OUT? I REALIZE THAT PEARSE HAS JUST BEEN NAMED BUT IT MAY BE THAT WAVELL COULD GIVE HIM THE POST OF INTENDANT GENERAL NOW TEMPORARILY CHARGED TO GENERAL BRETT IN ADDITION TO HIS, BRETT'S, REGULARLY ASSIGNED ROLE AS DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER. WE WOULD BE AGREEABLE TO THE POST OF DEPUTY SUPREME COMMANDER BEING TEMPORARILY LEFT VACANT IN ORDER THAT GENERAL BRETT MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO COMMAND THE COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCES. I FEEL THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE UNITED STATES HAVE ONE OF THE IMPORTANT COMMANDS IN THE ABDA AREA. WILL YOU LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON THIS.

3. THE STAFF HAVE BEEN GIVING CONSIDERATION TO THE MATTER OF INCLUDING THE AUSTRALIANS, THE DUTCH AND THE NEW ZEALANDERS IN THE JOINT STAFF CONFERENCES. WHILE THEY HAVE NOT GIVEN ME A FINAL ANSWER, I THINK I CAN SAY THAT THEIR GENERAL FEELING, WITH WHICH I CONCUR, IS THAT ALL POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL MATTERS CONCERNING NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE HANDLED IN LONDON AND THAT MILITARY MATTERS BE RESOLVED HERE.

4. HOWEVER, TO HAVE ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES REPRESENTED EACH BY 3 MEN ON THE JOINT STAFF CONSIDERING ABDA PROBLEMS WOULD PROVIDE FOR AN ALTOGETHER UNWILY BODY. WE ARE ALL STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT THE

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

CONTI PAGE 2.

By W.J. StewartDate Oct 1974 original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

37139

## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	FOR ACTION		PRIORITY
RELEASED BY			ROUTINE
DATE			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

**PAGE 2 OF OPNAV 310135 CR 0582 TO ALUSNA LONDON.**

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME

DATE

TIME

OCT

TEXT

PRESENT WORKING ORGANIZATION IS FUNCTIONING VERY EFFICIENTLY FOR THE COLLABORATION OF BRITISH - U.S. AFFAIRS WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE THE MAJOR PORTION OF THE MATTERS TO BE HANDLED. WE THINK IT SHOULD REMAIN AS AT PRESENT BUT WITH THIS IMPORTANT SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENT TO MEET THE SPECIAL COMPLICATIONS OF THE ABDA AREA;

5. THAT IN CASES IN WHICH THE DUTCH, THE AUSTRALIANS AND THE NEW ZEALANDERS ARE CONCERNED THE COMBINED STAFF WILL INVITE THEIR PARTICIPATION IN DISCUSSION OF SUCH MATTERS AS INVOLVE THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND COLLABORATION. IT IS ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, THAT IN THOSE CASES WHERE IMMEDIATE ACTION IS REQUIRED THE INDIVIDUAL ADVICE OF THE OFFICERS CONCERNED BE GIVEN WITHOUT WAITING FOR FORMAL WORD FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE GOVERNMENTS.

6. WE WILL UNDERTAKE HERE TO WORK OUT A CLOSE AND INTIMATE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 3 MILITARY MISSIONS OF AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND MAKE SURE THAT THEIR ADVICE IS IN NO SENSE PERFUNCTORY BUT WILL BE CONSIDERED IMPORTANT AND ESSENTIAL IN DETERMINING THE GENERAL POLICIES OF THE WAR IN THE ABDA AREA.

7. THIS SEEMS TO BE OUR JOINT STAFF OPINION HERE. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

8. THANK YOU EVER SO MUCH FOR YOUR WIRE. IT IS FUN TO BE IN THE SAME DECADE WITH YOU.

9. CONGRATULATIONS ON YESTERDAY'S VOTE. WE ALSO HAD ONE VOTE IN OPPOSITION.

ROOSEVELT.

CAPT. MC-CREA (WHITE HOUSE).....COPY.

FILE, SEALED SECRET FILE.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U

By *W. J. Stewart*

Date OCT 6 1946 The original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

37139

310135.

C O P Y

January 31, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
LONDON

Dill is out of town but I want you to know that I deeply hope he will stay and sit on the Joint Staff in addition to Weemys and Navy and Air. There is no reason why the Staff should not be composed of the above four and also Stark, Marshall, Arnold and King.

There seems to be only one question and that is just whom Dill would represent. I have no objection to his representing the Joint Staffs in London but I particularly hope that I can regard him as the representative of you in your capacity as Minister of Defense. Perhaps this latter status could be put on an informal basis but one which would be understood between you and me.

All of this is wholly agreeable to my people on the Joint Staff and also to Harry.

ROOSEVELT



January 31, 1942.

FOR FORMER NAVAL PERSON  
LONDON

Dill is out of town but I want you to know that I deeply hope he will stay and sit on the Joint Staff in addition to Weemys and Navy and Air. There is no reason why the Staff should not be composed of the above four and also Stark, Marshall, Arnold and King.

There seems to be only one question and that is just whom Dill would represent. I have no objection to his representing the Joint Staffs in London but I particularly hope that I can regard him as the representative of you in your capacity as Minister of Defense. Perhaps this latter status could be put on an informal basis but one which would be understood between you and me.

All of this is wholly agreeable to my people on the Joint Staff and also to Harry.

ROOSEVELT

I FEEL THAT DILL IS MAKING HIS WAY HERE EXTREMELY WELL AND  
I HATE TO SEE YOU CHANGE HIS STATUS. IF IT WERE ANOTHER TYPE OF

- 3 -

PERSONALITY I THINK THAT DIFFICULTIES MIGHT ARISE BUT IN DILL'S  
CASE I AM SURE THAT SITTING IN ON THE JOINT STAFF HE CAN ADD  
TREMENDOUSLY TO OUR COMMON ENTERPRISE HERE. I WILL UNDERTAKE TO  
MAKE THIS POSITION CLEAR AND AGREEABLE TO STARK, KING, MARSHALL  
AND ARNOLD. I AM SURE THEY WILL AGREE.

IF YOU WISH I SHALL BE VERY HAPPY TO DISCUSS IT WITH DILL  
AS WELL. I HAVE THE GREATEST REGARD FOR HIM AND WOULD PREFER TO  
SEE WYMSS REMAIN AND DILL HAVE THE STATUS WHICH WE AGREED UPON  
WHILE YOU WERE HERE. THE IMPORTANT DETAIL IN DILL'S CASE IS  
WHETHER OR NOT HIS PRESENCE CAN BE USEFUL. I AM SURE THAT IT CAN *be*

*useful to the staff but also especially  
to me personally*

TELEGRAM

February 11, 1942.

TO: AMEMBASSY  
LONDON

/s/ Harry Hopkins

NUMBER 102

~~REDACTED~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT  
YOUR NUMBER 26.

1. I AM GIVING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO CHINA AND SENT THE GENERALISSIMO ANOTHER PERSONAL WIRE LAST NIGHT ASSURING HIM THAT AN ADEQUATE AIR TRANSPORT SCHEME WOULD BE SET UP BETWEEN INDIA AND CHINA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. INCIDENTALLY, I HAVE TAKEN TWENTYFIVE GOOD COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTS AWAY FROM THE AIR LINES TO ADD THEM TO OUR AFRICAN FERRY SERVICE AT ONCE AND WILL TAKE MORE IF NECESSARY.
2. PRESSURE ON MCARTHUR IS GETTING MORE ACUTE.
3. THE NEW NAVAL COMMAND IN THE ABDA AREA IS ALL SET.
4. WE HAD A BAD BREAK LAST NIGHT IN THE LOSS OF THE NORMANDIE AND WILL NOT KNOW FOR A FEW DAYS WHETHER SHE IS A TOTAL LOSS OR NOT.
5. YOU CAN BE SURE THERE WILL BE NO GUARANTEES GIVEN ABOUT NON-OCCUPATION OF MADAGASCAR OR REUNION.
6. OUR STREAM OF BIG BOMBERS IS GETTING BLOCKED UP AT BANGALORE BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTIES OF LANDING FIELDS IN SUMATRA AND JAVA BUT WE HOPE TO BREAK THAT JAM SOON.
7. I DO HOPE AUCHINLECK CAN GIVE ROMMEL A PUSH SOON.
8. HARRY IS MUCH BETTER BUT I AM TRYING TO CONFINED HIM TO BARRACKS UNTIL HE LEARNS TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W.F. Howard

Date OCT 6 1971

102

TELEGRAM

DECLASSIFIED  
By Dep. Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart  
Date Oct 8 1971

FEBRUARY 20, 1942

TO: AMEMBASSY  
LONDON

NUMBER 100.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE  
PRESIDENT.

YOUR NUMBER 25.

1. I AM GIVING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO CHINA AND SENT THE  
GENERALISSIMO ANOTHER PERSONAL WIRE LAST NIGHT ASSURING HIM THAT  
AN ADEQUATE AIR TRANSPORT SCHEME WOULD BE SET UP BETWEEN INDIA AND  
CHINA IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. INCIDENTALLY, I HAVE TAKEN TWENTYFIVE  
GOOD COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTS AWAY FROM THE AIR LINES TO ADD THEM TO  
OUR AFRICAN FERRY SERVICE AT ONCE AND WILL TAKE MORE IF NECESSARY.

2. PRESSURE ON MCARTHUR IS GETTING MORE ACUTE.

3. THE NEW NAVAL COMMAND IN THE ABDA AREA IS ALL SET.

4. WE HAD A BAD BREAK LAST NIGHT IN THE LOSS OF THE NORMANDIE  
AND WILL NOT KNOW FOR A FEW DAYS WHETHER SHE IS A TOTAL LOSS OR NOT.

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BUT WE HOPE TO BREAK THAT JAM SOON.

7. I DO HOPE AUCHINLECK CAN GIVE ROMMEL A PUSH SOON.

8. HARRY IS MUCH BETTER BUT I AM TRYING TO CONFINED HIM TO  
BARRACKS UNTIL HE LEARNS TO TAKE CARE OF HIMSELF.



2-12-42

Miss Tully,

For the President's  
Files: Copies of secret  
messages No. 103, 104,  
and 105 and attached  
memos.

Respectfully  
L.P. Schuler  
at. wbu.



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

Boyle

February 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made on the telephone a little while ago, I am sending you herewith the suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

February 10, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the request you made on the telephone a little while ago, I am sending you herewith the suggested message for you to send to Mr. Churchill.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,


SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72

By RHPR Date 2/11/72

The President,  
The White House.



## NAVAL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER		EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM	OPNAV	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA LONDON	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY	PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT			ROUTINE
DATE	FEB 11, 1942			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROM		INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY				ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY				DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

112149 CR 1318

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

NO 103

P1A ✓

DECLASSIFIED  
 By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
 By W. J. Stewart Date 2/11/72



NO DISTRIBUTION

February 10, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON.

#103 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In view of the information received from many sources and in view of the admission of Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan to Admiral Leahy on February 9 that food supplies and trucks had in fact been shipped from France in French vessels to Tunis for the use of the Axis forces in North Africa, I felt it necessary to send a personal message today to Marshal Petain to be delivered immediately by Admiral Leahy.

My message to Petain was in substance as follows:

"The American Government has information that the French Government has entered into some arrangement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of supplies and possibly war material to Tunis for delivery to the enemy forces in Libya. There can be no possible justification under the terms of the Armistice for the shipment of war materials or other direct aid to the Axis Powers and without official assurances from the Vichy Government that no military aid will go forward to the Axis

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date OCT 6 1971

*Sent via Hand Communication  
OPNAV No. 112149 of Feb. 1942.*

in any theater of war and that French ships will not be used in the furtherance of their aggression, Admiral Leahy will be instructed to return immediately to the United States for consultation as to our future policy."

The step which I have taken appears to be responsive to the views of your Government as communicated yesterday by Halifax to Welles. The possibility contemplated in my message to Petain is of course serious, but I am hopeful that my message may result, at least temporarily, in checking the sending of further supplies and in preventing greater and more serious forms of collaboration with the Axis on the part of the Vichy Government.

U:SW:DMK

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By W. J. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971

NO DISTRIBUTION

February 16, 1942

AMERICAN EMBASSY

LONDON.

#103 FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM THE PRESIDENT.

In view of the information received from many sources and in view of the admission of Marshal Petain and Admiral Darlan to Admiral Leahy on February 9 that food supplies and trucks had in fact been shipped from France in French vessels to Tunis for the use of the Axis forces in North Africa, I felt it necessary to send a personal message today to Marshal Petain to be delivered immediately by Admiral Leahy.

My message to Petain was in substance as follows:

"The American Government has information that the French Government has entered into some arrangement with the Axis Powers providing for the use of French ships for the transportation of supplies and possibly war material to Tunis for delivery to the enemy forces in Libya. There can be no possible justification under the terms of the Armistice for the shipment of war materials or other direct aid to the Axis Powers and without official assurances from the Vichy Government that no military aid will go forward to the Axis

Answered by PM #28.


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By W. J. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971

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By W. J. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971





February 11, 1942.

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference the Prime Minister's message of this morning stating that the British Air Ministry would like to announce Air Marshal Peirse as Air CINC, the problem with us is whether or not it is advisable to announce, at the moment of informing the U.S. public of the passage of Naval Command in ABDA from an American to the Dutch, that the Air Commander is to be a Britisher.

We think that from the United States point of view it would be desirable to delay the announcement regarding Peirse for the time being, unless the Prime Minister is under serious pressure for such a declaration, in view of the Singapore situation. However, the British public know that they have supreme command in ABDA, and a full general as Chief of Staff for Wavell.

We suggest the following reply from you to the Prime Minister:

"Reference your message regarding announcement of Air Marshal Peirse as Commander of Combined ABDA Air Force colon in view of effect on United States public of announcement to-day that naval command is passing from United States to Dutch I would prefer to delay publicity regarding Peirse for the time being stop If such delay is an embarrassment to you I will reconsider stop"

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Chief of Naval Operations

Chief of Army Air Forces

Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleets

February 11, 1942.

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*See attached  
for what  
actually  
sent -*

  
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

  
Chief of Naval Operations

  
Chief of Army Air Forces

 R. Adm.  
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleets

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
WAR PLANS DIVISION  
WASHINGTON

HH  
Will you talk  
with me about  
this tonight?

February 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK:

Attached hereto is a suggested draft of a reply by the President to the Prime Minister, to be used in the event that the President rejects the one already signed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The gist of the attached draft was suggested by the Chief of Staff as an alternative.

KHD

Very truly  
D. D. Eisenhower

D. D. EISENHOWER,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.

Incl.

This was left by Captain McCreary  
with Harry Hopkins last night.  
Harry must have left it on Pilobolus  
desk. It has no significance  
as original — was sent Edwards

February 11, 1942.

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D. D. EISENHOWER,  
Brigadier General, G.S.C.

Incl.



## NAVAL MESSAGE

## NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM <u>OPNAV</u>	FOR ACTION	ALUSNA LONDON	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY <u>PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT</u>			ROUTINE
DATE <u>FEB 12, 1942</u>			DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM _____	INFORMATION		PRIORITY
DECODED BY _____			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY _____			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

112237 CR 1329

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT
TEXT			

NO 104

P1A 

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart

Date OCT 6 1971

**SECRET**

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

TELEGRAM

FEBRUARY 11, 1942

TO: LONDON

No. 104 [REDACTED] AND PERSONAL FOR THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON FROM  
THE PRESIDENT.

REFERENCE YOUR NUMBER 27 REGARDING ANNOUNCEMENT OF AIR  
MARSHAL PEIRSE AS COMMANDER OF COMBINED ABDA AIR FORCE:  
IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE UNFAVORABLE EFFECT ON UNITED STATES PUBLIC  
OF ANNOUNCEMENT TODAY THAT NAVAL COMMAND IS PASSING FROM UNITED  
STATES TO DUTCH I WOULD PREFER TO DELAY PUBLICITY REGARDING  
PEIRSE FOR THE TIME BEING. IF SUCH DELAY IS AN EMBARRASSMENT  
TO YOU THEN WILL YOU GO AHEAD AND AUTHORIZE WAVELL TO MAKE THE  
ANNOUNCEMENT FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS.

WHILE WE ARE SORRY TO HAVE HARRIS GO WE WILL WELCOME AVILL  
AND I WILL MAKE IT MY BUSINESS TO SEE HIM SOON.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. G. Stewart  
Date OCT 6 1971